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INTRODUCr ION
In accord with the democratic theory which would have govern-
ment decisions subject to the will of the majority, we have established
election machinery through which the greater number regularly assert
their control. But, although we have subjected our officials to
the popular will at election time,' we have set up no machinery that
will enable them- to determine the popular will at other times.
Between elections they must depend largely on guess work to ascertain
the state of public opinion on any given issue. Their personal
insights and intuitive sense of public attitudes and reactions may
thus determine not merely their own political fate but also the
success or failure of national policies.
Now that foreign policy has become a central issue in our
national life, and virtually all Americans are personally affected
by major foreign policy decisions, it :.s essential that such decisions
have popular support. Historically, however, since foreign affairs
by their very nature have been remote from the lives of most Ameri-
cans and in their day-to-day conduct must be handled by those
who have an intimate knowledge of persons and places far removed
from the American scene, we have boon willing to loavO forein polic-
making to those whom we regard as experts. The President and Congress
4-1
have created foreign policy with relatively little guidance from
the public. We have sought no constitutional means whereby we can
make known public opinion on specific foreign policy issUes.
Both the lack of an informod public oinion on foreign niinirS
nA the seim of their rooteras reflect ertain aspect3 of te foer n
acte te sti n 11 to ma0ke any pulibc role in the 'orat ion
r foiGn policy difficult, if not altogether impossible.
Tho deands of a highly competitive solcety have zbnorbed the
individual Ame-ican's energy; and only when American intereats are
visably throatonod by a roaring crisisp ill he focus his attentiod
abroad,, He associates foreign affair with the expenditure of large
sums of money and, possible risk to en's lives. Moreover, if not
susceptible to a crisis solution Jch as a declaration of war,
- foreign affairs seem a loug dra -out process; end we Americans,
while prepared willingly and optimistically to concentrate for a
brief time to Offect a Solution, lose interent in a problem which
demands suntained effort over a long period The complex and
elastic approach rcquired by foreign policy problemq has little
appeal to a people who place thoir fai th in simple., straightforward
plans and quick, concrete action Thus Ancric.ans have clung to the
belief that the Cold War could be resolved if the American and
Russian people could somehow get together and talk out their differ-
ences; and they have been suspicicus of the nays -of the State
I See Gabriel A. Almond, The Amorican Poople and Foreign Policy,
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1950, Chapter 111,
3Department " expert"--a mood which whas prompted Gabriel Almond
to comment that: "There is a heritage of Jacksonian amateurism
which perpetuates the myth that America is full of Cincinnatuses.
It is little wonder that the problem of accurately determining
public attitudes toward foreign. affairs has long perplexed American
statesmen. George Kennan, writing about the creation of the Policy
Planning Staff in the State Department in 1947, declared that-
People working in this institutional framo-
work soon became conscious of the lack of any general
agreement, both within and without our govern-
ment, on the basic concepts underlying the conduct
3
of the external rolations of the United Stato,
How, then, in tho decicivo period before tho criso nrice, wihon
steps should be taken to prevent them, can the legislators determine
the will of the public? How can American public opinion be informed
and led in foreign affairs?
The public opinion poll may suggest partial answers to such
questions. In the last 20 years, as improved channels of comuni-
cation have made possible, if not a more intelligent public, at
least one which is better informed, there has been a growing awareness
both of the existing role of public opinion in dorestic and foreign
affairs and of the much more influential role possible for. an organized
2. Gabriel A0 Almond, op. cit, p, 147.
3' George Kennan, Angr ega10 9 -y2_1900-1950, Chicago;
University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. v.
4public opinion. On-o recsult of this waretess ham been the
privatoly couiced paulie oii pollu, a scien.iic attos't
to determine public opinion. Granting their limitations, srch
polls at least provide a clearer picture of the various tw.ats and
turns taken by the public mind than was available to rescixrchers
before its inception.
This paper examines the role of public opinion in cortain
military and foreign policy docisions since 1937, Vi:ut, we shall
try to determine what the pattern of public opinion ias in relation
to key foreign policy issues during the last two dee:.des. We shall
then observe the action taken by the Executive branch and Congress,
and try to discover in what way this action reflected or influenc-
ed popular wishes. The interaction of these groups anp.inst the
changing background of world events may thon give us icomo indication
of the oxtent to which public opinion is malloablo, that is-, to
what degree shifts in public attitudes came about dut to changing
circumrstances and the pronouncements and actions of i;overnment
leaders., In the end we may gain some porcopti.on of the extent to
which public opinion. can be led.
Finally, we shall try to discoveir whethor, in .;he apparent
inconsistencies of the popular mind, there is evideuce of something
-more than prejudice and self-interest; whether there is some relatively
5stable popular consensus concerning our foreign policy on which
government officials could rely and within the limits of which they
could act from day to day in the name of American democracy.
IU. S. NEUTRALITY OPINION
Even before the outbreak.of war in Europe in 1939 the growing
tension and conflicts of the Thirties on the international scene
did not pasa entirely unnoticed in a United States largely pre-
occupied with domestic problems,, But, although the nature of events
in Europe and /As,i zflvdo it impossible for any democratic nation- to
ignore them for long, recogritJ on of theJr importance was accorded
only reluctantly by the American people-. This reluctance to ac-
knowledge the dangor irherent in the rise of fascism made it difficult
for the American leaders to prepare the nation for the inevitable
struggle ogainst Germany and Japan-until the pressure of events
left little choice.
Personal Neutra lity
The general Amerlcnn attitude in the years before our entrance
into the war wv.a a mixture of indifference and strong isolationism--
complicated by a growing hostility tofard fascisom The indifference
to the importaince of internatioanl aff.irs is most strikingly
illustrated in the Gallup polls for the years 1935-1941 which asked:
"What do you regard as the most vital issue before the American
people today?" Not until- the spring of 1939 does "neutrality"
4
rank alongside "unemployment"; and not until the war actually
4. Hadley Cantil, Public Opinion, 1935-1946, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1951, p.. 678, AIPO April 19, 1939,
I
2breaks out in Europe in September do 47 per cent answer "noutrality"
and only 24 per cent still consider "unemployment" of greater im-
.5
portance. In response to specific questions about events in
Spain and China, Gallup polls showed that most Americans favored
complete withdrawal of American citizens and troops from China,
6
and 55 per cont had no preferences in the Sino-Japanese war,
In May of 1937, 79 per cent either had no opinion or felt that it
7
make no difterence which side won in Spain. The percentage who
8
didn't care was still as high as 60 per cent late in the next year.
The apparent indifference to the fate of other nations was
maitax.oa despite the cautious attempts of Presidont Roosevelt
to impress upon the American people the seriousness of the mounting
crisis. Ever mindful of the fate of President Wilson, Roooevelt
had underierd the Werld Economic Conference at the beginning oi
his first term; and he rcg1arly behaved in the early New Deal days
like thoroughly t'eformed Wilsonian if not an authentic isolationist.
But his activo pursuit of friends among our Latin American neighboro
and his speech at Chicago in 1937 suggesting that we join with other
5. Ibid., AIPO November 8, 1939.
6. Ibid.,AIPO August 2, 1937.
7. Jerome Bruner, Mandae From the People New York: Duell, Sloan
and Pearce, 1944, p. 18, AIPO May, 1937.
8. Ibid.,AIPO December, 1938.
3nations in a quarantine of agressors left lttle doubt as to where ,
ultimately his sentiments lay. Roosevelt*s warnings, however, were
little heeded either in Congress or throughout the nation; the
United States took no official position in the Spanish Civil War
and merely protested the Japanese invasions of China while refusing
to recognize their puppet state of Ianchukuo.
From the autumn of 1938 to the Spring of 1940 American in-
difference was shattered by a succession of shocking events--
Mu1nich, the outbreak of a general European war, and the frightening
rapidity of the fall of the low countries, France, and Scandinavia.
Nevertheless, the strong isolationist heritage was not easily over-
come. It bad been reinforced in the post World War I era by the
failure of that war to-solve the problem of internationial order in
Europe. Instead of now attempting to solve those problems collective-
ly and peacefully, the United States decided that they were in-
soluable and chose to try and forget them, concentrating instead
upori the development of our own 'unique' civilization--- which was
itself facing a serious domestic crisis. Disillusionment following
our first major involvment in international affairs was strong
throughout the whold inter-war period, and the closer contact with
the European nations in 1917-1918 had not necessarily bred closer
friendships.
4Whereas before the war of 1914-1918 people had been
isolationist because they knew little and cared little
about Europe., after that war they felt that they knew
rather too murh...9
The attempt to Isolate the nation from Europe's problems
was not due merely to afeeling of superiority. At the root of
isolationism was an overwhelming and deeply emotional desire for
peace; and peace, Americans felt , could be maintained only by stand-
ing aloof from international conflicts, thus avoiding wars which
were not in the American interest. The activities of the Nye
Committee seemed to confirm the suspicion that we had been tricked
into World War I -- a popular attitude reflected in a 1937 poll
indicati ng that 70 per cent of the nation felt that we should not
10
have entered that war.
Although the nation remained indifferent despite the rapid
march of events throughout the rest of the world, isolationism
tended to grow stronget among large factions because of those very
events. The more ominous the world situation looked, the more
determined many became to keep America isolated.
9. David Mitrany, American Interpretations, London: Contact Publications,
1946, p. 99.
10. Quincy Howe, The World Between the WarsNew York: Simon and
Schuster, 1953, Vol. II, p. 672.
Although President Roosevelt was anxious to take more positive
steps towards the prevention of war in Europe, the sharp criticism
he received when he suggested quarantining the aggressors, and
the opposition to the idea of a World Disarmament conference that
same year, forced him to modify his approach, if not his plans,
and continually reassure the isolationist elements that he would
not lead the United States into another war. That the nation did
not entirely trust his protestations was- evident in polls taken
from 1937-1939 showing that percentages of 67-73 felt that Congress
rather .than the President should control our neutrality policy,l
although the approval of his handling of foreign affairs increased
after September of 1939, when his warnings proved justified. But
distrust of his pleas for collective action on a world basis remain-
ed high and a majority from 1938-1942 consistently registered the
opinion that our reluctance to participate in a collective organiza-
12
tion to preserve peace was in no way responsible for World War II.
11. Philip E. Jacob, "Influences of World Events on U.S.'Neutrality'
Opinion, Public Opinion QuarterlyVol. IV, March , 1940, p. 63.
12. Hadley Cantil, op.cit., pp. 403-404, AIPO September 23, 1938,
July 29, 1941, December 15, 1942.
6Despite its apparent strength, the personal neutrality which
the American people hoped to maintain could not withstand for long
the effects of the injustices perpetrated by the Fascist govern-
ments, and, more important, their threatening. military and geographic
gains. The gradual increase in hostility towards Germany, Japan,
and Italy can be charted in direct relation to the expansion of
their power. It was the course of world events, rather than the
efforts of President Roosevelt or the work of such groups as the
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, which led to a
marked increase in sympathy for the Allies and a willingness to
risk war to aid them.
Increasing hostility towards Germany in particular can easily
be traced throughout the years prior to our entrance into the war.
Even in 1935 Germany was the nation most disliked by Americans --
no doubt due largely to her World War I role. But more than half
of those questioned had no feeling one way or another about foreign
nations; and as late as 1937, 62 per cent of a sample group had no
particular attitude towards Germany. However, by the ±irst half
of 1938, as the war tension increased, opinion had changed to such
an extent that 65 per cent admitted that they hoped for the defeat
13
of Germany shculd she go to war with France and England. After
13. Philip E. Jacob, op. cit p. 51., AIPO May 27, 1938.
7the Munich crisis and at the height of the anti-semitic drive in
Germany, 65 per cent stated their willin ess to boycott German
goods0 14
Personal neutrality towards the is powers was never regained
after Munich. Americans were by n means sure that 'peace with
honor' had been achieved, and the atmosphere was one of uneasiness,
although we did not hesitate to voice indignation at Japanese action
in China and at the Soviet invasion of Finland and the Soviet
pact with the Nazis. The Nazi invasion of Poland struck fear into
the hearts of Americans, a fear that was briefly supplanted by a
misplaced optimism during the 'phony war' of the winter of 1940,
when isolationist sentiment ran high, But the nation was united
now in its anti-fascist attitudes despite Hitler's offers of peace.
The shock with which Americans watched the fall of Europe and the
London blitz in 1940 sharply increased the realization of America's
stake in the outcome of the war and markedly strengthened the sym-
pathy for the Allied cause.
The presidential election in the fall of 1940 revealed the
degree of unity that existed within the nation on foreign policy
issues. The events of the past summer were fresh in the minds of
14. Ibid., p. 52. AIPO March 15, 1939.
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most voters, although understanding may not have been commensurate
with their importance. Our hatred of war had not diminished, howr-
ever, and, with nonintervention the overwhelming sentiment, the two
candidates had great difficulty making any significant differences
in their foreign policy proposals. Both vishod to aid the Allies;
neither wished for United States intervention; neither dared to
hint that the two might prove incompatible. The result was that
foreign affairs were taken out of the campaign by mutual consent
until the last few weeks, when the Pepublicans, in a play for the
noninterventionist vote, made bitter charges that Roosevelt could
not be trusted to keep the nation at peace. But Americans seemed
satisfied with the President's gradual policies, and during the
next year approved the steps that he took to reaffirm support of
the Allies. In the autumn of 1941 some three-fourths of those
Americans with opinions declared themselves still in favor of his
foreign policy.15 In the few months prior to our entry into the
war the American people were united in their desire to see the Axis
powers defeated. The question was now only one of means. There
was no longer any significant degree of personal neutrality.
15, Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street,New York: Macmillan
Company, 1948, p. 100.
9Financial and Commercial Neutrality
The undermining of personal neutrality was not accompanied by
a similar rapid disintegration of support for a policy of financial
and commercial neutrality. Although war raged about us, we clung
to the idea that we could insulate ourselves from it by strict
control of our finances and trade. The rationale for this type
of thinking was supplied by the dubious findings of Senator Nye's
group, which would have had the nation believe that it had beva
duped into entering the first war because of the achemes of the
munitions makers Our attitude towards international finance had
been soured further by the failure of the European nations to repay
their war debts to us-- a failure which had prompted Congress to
pass the Johnson Act in 1934 forbidding loans to governments in
default to the United States.
The belief that our trade and finance policies had been the
cause of our entrance into World War 1. bad also given rise to a
series of Neutrality Acts in 1935-1937 which would have insured us
against entering another war for similar reasons. The major draw-
backs of this legislation were that it allowed no distinctions between
belligerents prohibiting loans and shipments of arms to the invaded
nation as well as the aggressor, and that it wrongly assumed the
United States would never be attacked. It was felt that we could
10
avoid war merely by severely limiting all contacts with the belligerents
and, in effect, abandoning our traditional right of freedom of the
seas. The limitations that it imposed upon the executive's hand-
ling of foreign affairs were a decided obstacle to the efforts of
Roosevelt and Hull to bring aid to the hard-pressed Allies, but, in
view of the results of public opinion polls taken in this prewar period>
the Acts seemed indeed to be a reflection of popular attitudos.
American thinking on the matter of loans to the Alliod nations
showed remarkable stability in a period when many other attitudes
were undergoing fluctuation in accordance with the changing events
abroad. Late in 1937, despite our traditional goodwill toward
China, Americans refused by an overwhelming 95 per cent to consider
lending money either to China or Japan.16 As late as the end of
1938 nearly half the population still wented to collect the debts
incurred by the European nations in Worl War 1,1/ and in the Spring
of 1939 only 21 por cent favored chang g the Johnson Act so thnt
we could lend money to France and Eng and in case of a European
18
war. Another 10 per cent would have favored loaning them the funds
to buy "airplanes and other war materials" in this country 1
16. Hadley Cantril, op. cit., p. 1101. AIPO September 19, 1937,,
17. T. -A. Bailey, op. cit.,p. 183,
18. Hadley Cantril, op. cit.,p. 1101. AIPO April 19, 1939.
19. Ibid, AIPO May 14, 1939'
The outbreak of hostilities made very little difference to
the thrifty American. Despite a Gallup poll in October indicating
that 62 per cent of the American people were willing to "do every-
thing possible to help England and France win the war except go to
,t20
war, when questioned specifically about lending money to those
nations to enable them to buy war supplies here, 82 per cent were
21
opposed. That this reaction was due in part to these nations
having defaulted on their World War I loans is indicated by polls
that same month on the matter of loans to Finland, the only nation
that did repay us. Just after her invasion by Russia, on November
30th 1939, some 65 per cent of the sample of respondents would
have allowed Finland to borrow money to buy war supplies here, and
when queried about a specific sum of money-- a type of question which
usually brings approval down, 61 per cent still felt that Finland
22
should bc allo.'d to borrow $60,000,000.
The first indication that the public might favor a more lenient
policy toward the Allied powers came. with the public approval of
20. Ibid.. p. 967. AIPO October 3, 1939
21. Ibid., p. 1101. AIPO December 22, 1939
J22. Ibid.
1 0
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the President's islands-for-debts scheme, whereby we would acquire
the West Indian Islands of England and France in return for the
funds which they owed us. This had the approval of nearly 7 in 10
23
Americans. By March of 1940 a narrow margin of 55 per cent to
45 per cent favored loaning money to England and France to tuy war
supplies hearo if it seemed that they might be losing the war.,
However, over 50 per cent still continued to oppose loans for the
25purchase of goods for China and loans to Norway and Sweden after
26
the invasion of Scandinavia. Not until the Werhmacht had swept
over most of Europe, and London had been sabjected to the fury of
the luftwaftz, was a fairly small majority willing to amend tho
27
Johnson Act so that England could borrow money from us... (541-46%)
But 65 per cent (vs. 35%) felt strongly that the Act should not be
changed to enable both England and France to borrow funds. 2 8
The dispute over selling war materials to the Allied nations
focused initially on the Neutrality legislation, which placed an
embargo upon direct or indirect shipments of such goods to the
belligerents in time of war, As long as this embargo remained in
23. T. A. Bailey, op. cit., p. 184.
24. Hadley Cantril, op. cit., p. llO1,AIPO March 4, 1940.
25. Ibid., p. 1102. AIPO February 20, 1940.
26. Ibid., AIPO April 28, 1940,
27. Ibid., AIPO November 20, 1940,
28. Ibid.
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effect, it was of great harm to the Allied cause, for England and
France had not built up a war machine comparable to that possessed
by Germany, . and both allies were in great need of any war materials
that the U.S. could supply.
The situation became critical in the spring of 1939 when the
Cash and Carry provision of the 1937 Act expired and signs of war
continued to increase. The President and Secretary Hull were
anxuous to have the whole of the Neutrality legislation repealed
but were persuaded that, in view of the strong isolationist bloc in
the Senate, it would 'be best to try only to revoke the arms embargo.
This, it was believed, would serve notico to Germany that we would
not abondon our friends should war come, for it would be the British
navy that would be able to take advantage of our supplies. The
President, fearing to aruse the hostility of his Congressional
enemies, procede:d cautiously and left a large sharo of the battle
to Senators Pitmn and Blooim. B lm oost eight months of doe 1eo
ended in July of 1939 in a failure to revoke the embargo. Congrcs
had not been persuaded either of the imr-imence of war or that the
President 'could be trusted with the discretionary powers that wouald
be his under the new legislation.
The caution exercised by the President in attempting to get the
embargo revoked was perhaps necessary in view of Senatorial opposition,
.14
but it was not entirely justified in light of the results of Gallup
polls taken in this period. It is true that in September of 1938,
at the time of the Anich crisis, only 34 per cent expressed
willingness to sell military equipment to England and France in
case of war, but by February of the next year the sentiment had
-30 31.
risen to 52 per cent, and by the end of March to 66 per cent.
During -the summier months the percentage stayod at around 60 per
cent-surely an adequate indication that Congress should take favor-
able action on the Bloom Bill, especially when it would seem that
the majority backed the step despite the fact that it was likely
32
that such action would lead to our involvement in war. However,
when asked specifically about the Neutrality Law, approval of its
revision was not so clear cut. Only 57 per cent in March said that
33
it should be changed, and in August 51 per cent said that Congress
34
was right in defeating the Bloom Bill, although the country was
evenly divided on the eve of war about the wisdom of changing the
neutrality legislation,
29. Ibid.,, p. 1156, AIPO September 13, 1938,
30. Ibid., AIPO February 16, 1939.
310 Ibid., p. 1157, AIPO March 21, 1939.-
32. Ibid., AIPO July 26, 1939.
33. Ibid., AIPO March 30, 1939.
34. Ibid., AIPO August 8, 1939.
35. Ibid., AIPO August 17, 1931.
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The revision of theineutrality law which was effected once the
outbreak of war had given the movement impetus did give the President
his cash-and-carry clause back and a repeal of the embargo on
finished munitions, at the same time imposing severe restrictions
on American shipping. But the Congressional vote was pretty solidly
on party lines despite the relative lack of partisanship shown through-
out the country. In September, while the debate was under way, as
many as 62 per cent, when asked directly about revision of the
36
bill, felt that it should be changed, and, when asked in more
general terms if "England and France should be allowed to buy war
supplies hero if they pay cash and take them away in their own
37
ships,"'- 70 no ent ex'ressed approval. Both opponents and advocates
of the proposed revisiov gavc es their reason the desire
o p t~ 5ie ~sout of the war-ac 2
were mnrkedly mere eager to aid Britain and FrcrCe.
Once the Neutrality Iaws had been liberalized--to the extent
that the Allies could now buy war material hero by paying cash and
transporting their goods home in their own ships with no danger
to American men--tho demand for further aid died down during the
winter of the 'phony' war. Not until the spring of 1940 and the
36. Ibid., p. 1158, AIPO September 19, 1939.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid, AIPO October 10, 1939.
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German sweep through the Low Countries, France, and Scandinavia
were there signs that Americans decidedly favored increased aid
to England. In fact, the horror with which the people of the United
States watched the advance tf the German army is distinctly
mirrored in the public opinion polls taken in the spring of that
year. ,.Sharp 'r-winga occurred in the percentagen favoring increases
in aid, toxos, and defense measures, (See Chart .1, p. 16.,)
An indication of dissatisfaction with the current policy of
aid, involving no official commitment to either side, could be seen
in a March poll indicating that 52.1 per cent wanted to "Do every-
thing possible to help England and France without actually going to
,40
war if Germany seemed to be wiuing.4 A series of polls begun in
May of 1940 is an even clearer indication that the Administration
could have adopted a far bolder program of aid to the Allies--and
with somo justificaticn claimed that they had the bckling of a mjortlv
of' the American people.
The first of thene polls asked what we should do about holping
England and France. The respondents were given four courses of
action that could be followed: 1) doing less than we are doing now;
2) doing neither more nor less; 3) declaring war on Germany and
sending our armed forces abroad; 4) doing everything pobsible except
go to war. (On the last three dates France was eliminated from the
40. Hadley Cantril, Public Oninion 1935-19462 cit., p, 971,
OPOR March 8, 1940.
1question and Italy was aadod alongside Gorrw0ay.) T1o rsu1ta wee
41
as follows,
1 2 3 4
May 14, 1940 6% 19% 4% 67%
23 6 21 4 65
June 11 5 12 3 73
25 8 15 5 67
July 20 6 72 3 14
Sept 1 5 11 5 76
Perhaps even more significant As the answer to a question asked for
a wholo year--froiu May of 1940 to 1y , 1941, &bowig tie gradual
upward curve of the number willing to aid England at the risk of
United States involvment in the war.
42
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This tremendous upsurge in sentiment favoring a greatly augmented
aid program was scarcely altruistic. The rapidity of the German
sweep was horrifying; the broad expanse of protecting ocean shrank
correspondingly each time the Nazis crossed the borders of another
European nation. More and more Americans began to be aware that
the safety of the United States was inextricably bound up with the
fate of tba Allied Nations. And as long as it was thought that
Britain was willing and able to withstand the German onslaughtp
Americans were willing to send her all possible aid consonant with
our security here at home.
The decided shift in attitudes in the spring of 1940 from one
of a somewhat passive support of the Allies to one of an active
espousal of the Allied cause led inevitably to our irrevocable
commitment to the British. Those large numbers who now favored aid
at the risk of war also supported President Roosevelt when he agreed
to exchange some 50 average deatroyers in return for British bases.
The 61 por cent of the population who favored the destroyer
deal included the Republican candidate for Preoident, Wendeli Wilkie,,
Criticism was made only of the manner in which the deal was concluded.
Popular support continued for the President s assertion inDecember
43. Walter Johnson, The-R attle Against Isolation, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1944, p. 112, AIPO August 1940.
a #
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of that year that "WeutAst be the great arsenal of Democracy,"
Although the Destroyer-Bases deal was a signi ficant departure
from any pretense at neutrality, it could be argued that the terms
were so favorable to the United States that it was excusable on the
grounds of our national defense. The Lend Lease agreement with
Britain in the early spring of' 19411 should therefore be token as the
point of no return, From this time on, there could be no i eversa.l
of our policy of support of the Allied n tion,. That the American
people made ti.s commitment unwittingl cannot be argued. The pro-
posal was formally made by President, oosevelt in his aninal message
to Congress on January 6, 1941 B the end of the month 82 per cent
44
of the populace had heard about the plan, and by February 141h
45
a remarkable 91 per cent said that they had heard of -he bill
The majority support was not overwhelming, approval never being
46
voiced by more than 58 per cent; only 31 por cent supported it
47
in the belief that the measure would help keep us out of the war .
In the last year before our entrance into the war public opinion
44e Hadley Cantril, Public Opinionl1935-46, ,, it, p. 409, OPOR
January 29, 1941
45. Ibid., p. 410, AIPO February 14, 1941.
46. Ibid., p. 409, OPOR January 29, 1941.
47. Ibid., p. 410, AIPO February 28, 1941.
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favoring aid did not fluctuate greatly. We openly and wholehearted-
ly backed the Allies; and although there was no further impetus
to extending our commitment, perhaps becadde there were no further
setbacJs after England successfully weathered the blitz, there was
support for the Administration policy of increased aid to China,
but restrictions were placed on trade with Japan, and Japanese
assets in this country were frozen. The question of aid to the
Soviet Union once she had been attacked by Germany, was not so
clear cut. The traditional American sympathy and friendliness
for China had never extended to Russia; and there was a large
reservoir of ill will toward the Communists. There was also the
belief that the Soviet Union could not withstand the armies of
Germany for long, and that any aid to her would eventually fall into
German hands. But in the summer of 1941 Germany seemed more menacing
than communism, and the attitude that bolstering the Soviet Union
would gain time for us prevailed0
By autumn of 1941 there was certainly no noteworthy dissent
on the policy of all-out aid to the Allies, and there was public
support for American convoys of Allied shipping as far as Iceland,
a system begun late in August as a logical sequel to the Lend Lease
program insuring the safe arrival of such aid. The last step in the
abolition of a policy of commercial neutrality was inevitable--a
22
repeal of the most objectionable sections of the old Neutrality
Laws by a close congressional vote in November. This made possible
an arming of American merchant ships that the convoys were designed
to protect, a measure backed by 81 per cent of the American people,
and the use of American ships to carry goods to Britain, which had
48
the support of 61 per cent.
Military Neutrality
The consistency with which an overwhelming majority of American
citizens opposed direct intervention in the World War right up until
Pearl Harbor was due in large part to the belief, or hope, that
what happened abroad would not endanger out scourity at home. When,
however, the startling Allied reverses of 1940 took place, a curious
dualism in our thinking about military neutrality developed. On the
one hand, Americans continued to vociferously oppcse any declaration
of war on the Axis, and, on the other hand,they became more and more
eager to take steps to strengthen the Allies and contain the Axis
powers--steps that could not but lead inevitably to our formal
participation in the conflict. At the same time that we stood
firmly against actual intervention we began to declare it more
48. William L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, The Undeclared War 1940-1941
New York: Harper & Bros., 1953, p. 758, AIPO November 1941.
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49. Hadley Cantril. "Opinion trends in World War II," Public Opinion O.arterlv, Vol. XI, Spring 1948,
p- 37. (no. 2 and no. 4 are part of Chart 2)
50. W. A. Lydgate. What Amnrica Thinks. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1944 p.35 (no. 1 and no. 3).
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important to aid the Allies and defeat Germany than stay out of the
war. (See Chart *2 and Chart $r3 pp. 18 and 23)
The change that came in public attitudes in the spring of 1940,
when a steadily increasing percentage began to feel that the sal-
vation of the Allies wns important enough to risk war, was due to
the sudden awareness that the Allied Nations were vital to our
security, that we continued to formally oppose intervention was
due to the frantic hope that somehow we could so strengthen England
with war materials that she could carry on the fight alone, and that
it would therefore aot be necessary for us to intervene.
The opposition to American participation in a second world
war had been strengthened by the widespread conviction in the inter-
war period that the nation had been foolisb to enter World War I.
We know that na late as 1937 Gallup had found 70 per cent declaring
our intervention in World War I a mistake,51 but, when questioned
about our probable intervention in a second conflict, there was
invariably a majority--from 1938-lf41---that felt we would be drawn
in once again. Only twice, in August of 1939, before the war broke
52 53
out, and in February of 1940 in the era of the 'phony' war,
51. Quincy Howe, op. cit., p. 672.
52. Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-1946, .2. cit., p. 966, AIPO
August 20, 1939.
53. William L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation,
New York; Harper & Bros., 1952, p. 351.
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did this group drop below 40 per cent. But by 1941 the percentage
of Americans who felt that our entrance was inevitable ranged from
54
72 to 85 per cent.
Although most Americans were sure that we would be drawn in, a
series of polls taken from 1937 onwards generally found that over
80 per cent believed that we should not enter. Only once, in May
55
of 1941, did those in favor of direct intervention reach 27 per
cent; by October of 1941 those favoring intervention were only
56
17 per cent of the total. Even with our friendliness towarde Finland
in the matter of loans, when asked if we should send our Army and
57
Navy to her aid, 95 per cent gave a flat 'no' as their answer.
This aversion- to a formal declaration, however, did not stand in
the way of a somewhat realistic view of the situation. In September
of 1941, 56 per cent of the population felt that for all practical
58
purposes we were already in the war.
54. See Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-1946, op. cit., p. 968.
55. Ibid., p. 973, AIPO May 29, 1941.
56. Ibid., p. 977, AIPO October 22, 1941.
57. Ibid., p. 970, AIPO February 20, 1940.
58. Ibid., p. 974, AIPO September 17, 1941..
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The attitudes about war in Asia deserve special note. Although
we both hated and feared Hitler's might, fear never predominated
in our attitude toward Japan. Since Americans were ignorsat of the
real power of Japan and contemptuous of her militaristic ambitions,
they were far more willing for the United States to take a strong
stand against the expansion of her Empire than against that of
Hitler. Although we had been indifferent to the outcome of Japan' s
struggle with China back in 1937, by the spring of 1939 her actions
in China had so enraged us that 72 per cent declared themselves
in favor of an embargo on the shipments of arms and munitions to
59
Japan, and 66 per cent were willing to boycott Japanese goods.
Upon the announcement of the Tripartite Pact in the autumn of 1940,
57 per cent felt it would be advisable for us to prevent Japan
60
from becoming more powerful even though we risked war.
Throughout theinext year the public continued to support the
restrictive policies adopted by the administration against Japan--
policies that made a clash with her inevitable. Yet on the eve of
59. Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation,. cit.,p. 152.
60. Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War 1940-194lp2. cit., p. 33.
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war only. 51 per cent suspected that we were about to go to war in
61
the Far East, and 79 per cent were confident that our navy was
62
strong enough to beat Japan's -- which perhaps oxplains why 69
63per cent were agreeable to taking steps to restrict Japanese power.
The American attitude was unmistakably hostile. In the summer of
1941, 52 per cent felt that the United States should go to war with
Japan i1 it was the only way to keep her from seizing the Dutch
64
East Indies and Singapore. But the contradiction was present here-
too. Throughout 1941 over 70 per cent repeatedly declared themselves
65
unwilling to actually declare war upon her.
Although Americans continued to oppose a declaration of war
against any Axis power, the polls indicated their willingness to
risk war to aid England and an increasing conviction that it was
more important to defeat Germany than to avoid war,,in other words,
that war under certain conditions might be preferable to a policy
of legal neutrality. In fact, when, in November of 1941, a representa-
tive sample was asked if they would go to war if the nation's leaders
61. Ibid., p. 923.
62. Hadley Uantril, Public Opinion 1935-46, op. cit.,p. 943,
.November 19, 1941.
63. Langer ana Gleason, eU Kc eWja1 r 9 1,l. .i ,p. 923.
64. Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-46, op. cit.,p. 1077, AIPO
July 29, 1941.
65. See Ibid., p. 975.
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agreed that it was the only way that Germany could be defeated,
66
as many as 70 per cent agreed that we should intervene. But the
contradictory strands in American attitudes--a willingness to
support warlike action while opposing actual intervention--made
it virtually impossible for the President to press for a declaration
of war even though he was urged on by the interventionists. Americans
were eager to back England with all measures short of actual war,
but shied away from formal declarations. In view of this prevailing
sentiment, it would have been impossible to have gotten a declaration
of war passed by the militant isolationist bloc in the Senate and
win the wholehearted support of the American people. An unrealistic
policy was the only one that the United States was prepared to
accept.
Attitudes towards Defense
Although Americans clung tenaciously to the idea that it was
possible to preserve their military neutrality, they were not unaware
of the necessity for maintaining strong defenses. The policy of
rearmament that President Roosevelt adopted in 1937, including an
attempt to strengthen the solidarity of the Western hemisphere and
66. Ibid.,p. 976 OOR October 19, 1941'.
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build up our military force, met with the approval of the American
people at all times. As early as 1935, 75 per cent wanted a larger
67
army and navy. Polls in 1938 before Munich indicated that 65
68
per cent were in favor of a larger army, and 53 per cent were
69
willing to pay more taxes to bring this about . By the end of
that November, 82 per cent wanted to increase the size of the army;
and Americans greeted with approval Roosevelt's announcement at
Kingston, Ontario that we would help defend Canada in the event of
an attack. This approval was indicative of a new awareness, encour-
aged by the Administration, of the importance of a united hemisphere
to our own security.
Throughout 1939 there were further indications that a more
extensive military build-up was desired. Public opinion in January
supported the President's plans for increased national defense, and
70
67 per cent of those polled agreed that such an increase was needed.
However, Congress in the next month refused to make a small appropri-
ation for a submarine base at Guam. The outbreak of war in the fall
67.. Iid., p. 939 AIPO October 26, 1935.
68. Ibid., p. 940 AIPO September 23, 1938.
69. Ibid., p. 941 AIPO September 23, 1938.
70. Ibid., p. 941 AIPO January 7, 1939.
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caused no change in the solidly favorab opinion on defense measures.
Americans did not want war; they were ot yet ready to commit them-
selves to the Allied cause but they ere well aware that the country's
security was going to depend upon ts strength. Even the most
confirmed isolationist did not d/spute this. Somewhat increased
support for a larger armed force was indicated in October, when
71
64 per cent (in contrast to only 53 per cent the previous autumn)
now were willing to pay more in taxes for a larger army. That
Hitler's peace proposals in the winter did not fool the American
people is indicated in a February poll showing 79 per cent behind
the President's proposed 28 per cent increase in spending for defense
72
purposes.
But the real upsurge in demand for a stronger America came
with the Allied defeats in the spring. The dramatic losses suffered
by the Allies left only 15 per cent of the American people feeling
that our armed forces were strong enough to withstand an attack by
73
any foreign power. Eighty-three per cent were now behind an
74
increase in our army even though it might mean more taxes; and,
71. Ibid., AIPO October 10, 1939.
72. Ibid., AIPO February 18, 1940.
73. Ibid.,p . 942 AIPO. June 2, 1940.
74. Ibid., AIPO May 14, 1940.
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two days later, on May 16th of 1940, an almost unanimous public
(92 per cent) was behind the President's request to Congress that
75defense spending be increased by one half in the next year. Now,
in July, Gallup revealed that 75 per cent were willing to pay
76
considerably more taxes" to meet the cost; and the more restricted
sample thken by Fortune found 93.6 per cent anxious for the govern-
77-
ment to spend 'whatever is neressary' to build up our forces quickly,
Congressional passage that summer of new measures for defense indicated
that it was not entirely unresponsive to public pressure.
At the same time that the polls clearly demonstrated the Immense
enthusiasm among Americans for stronger defenses, they also showed
that perbaps President Roosevelt and Congress were justified in
not proceeding with all the defense measures some Administration
advisors wished. There was evidence that the American public
wanted to 'have their cake' too. Polling results late in 1940
revealed a widespread tendency to think that increased defense pro-
duction goals could be met simply by hiring more men--rather than
by lengthening the work week. A Fortune poll also showed that 58.1
per cent felt that our present standard of. living could be maintained
75. Ibid., p. 942, AIPO May 16, 1940.
76.- Hadley Cantril, "America Faces the War: A Study in Public Opinion,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol IV, September 1940, p. 394, AIPO July 20, 1940.
77. Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-46, op. cit., p. 981,
FOR July 1940.
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despite the need for a large sector of the economy to shift to rearma-
78
ment. But the public was realistic enough to realize the value of
the Burke-Wadsworth Selective Service billi and 86 per cent favored
79-
Congress-' approval.
In the last year of peace there was no let-down in the demand
for military preparedness, but there continued to be controversy as
to the sums to be expanded to provide adequate security. Increased
funds for rearmament were apprcved by Congress; and further Executive
steps to forge tighter bonds within the Western Hemisphere, including
the Act of Havana and the move to take Iceland and Greenland under
our protection, met with public approval. In fact, the election of
1940 and polls taken in 1941 showed a large measure of support for
the way in which the President was handling the difficult problems
of foreign affairs and national defense. Only Congress, .in its
extension cf the Selective Service by only a single vote, showed
itself relucitant to support him.
Some Concluions on Prewar Opinion
Analyziig the interplay between public opinion, the Executive,
78. Public O.inion Quarterly, Vol V, March 1941, p. 162, FOR October 1940.
79. !anger aud Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 2 E. cit., p. 680.
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and Congress in the period prior to our entry into World War II,
four main conclusions emerge:
1. The zf IZh#e na.1,"on,i~) r'io~ to) thl-~ i:'C-zlengeo of
Fascism was largely determined by the course of events in Europe
and Asia rather than by any skillful maipulation of public opinion
by political leaders.
A glance at the public opinion polls -around the spring of 1940
will confirm this. The explanation is simple. When confronted by
the power of the German nation, the American people became frightened.
Swiftly and dramatically it became clear that the defeat of the
Allied nations might bring serious harm to the United States. From
that point on, Americans were willing to do almost anything to aid
the Allies as long as it was thought that England could win.
2. American opinion was strong/ly influenced by wishful thinking.
Although the events of the sp ing of 1940 had impressed most
Americans. with their gravity, t ere wgs still reluctance to accept
the full implications of the wdakened position of the Allies.
Although there was an increasing inclination to interven'e in the war
when it seemed that England would be unable to withstand the Axis
alone, it is debatable whether the American nation would have inter-
vened in time to prevent an English defeat.. Certainly there would
have been nowhere near the unanimity of opinion that Pearl Harbor
34
brought. The reluctance to accept the realities of the connection
between the cause of the war and the security position of the
United States can only be termed wishful thinking.
3. A comparison of public opinion with Congressional legisla-
tion clearly shows that Congress was not in tune with public opinion.
Public opinion polls showed that the American public was
willing to make loans to the Allied nations at the end of 1940;
the relevant section of the Neutrality law was not repealed for a
year. Public opinion was agreeable to selling war materials to
the Allies from early 1939 on; the Neutrality laws were not liberal-
ized until that fall, and the vote was heavily on partisan
lines then. The willingness of the American people to commit
themsoves more fully to the Allied cause was seen in the spring of
1940; the President's Destroyer-Bases deal was the first result.
Congress finally passed Lend Lease almost a year later. The final
revision of the Neutrality Laws was on a close vote, and.this on the
eve of war. On only two issues, intervention and defense, was
Congressional action relatively in accord with popular attitudes,
although even here there were certain lapses which could be seen in
the narrow margin of victory for the selective service extension.
If the Congressional body is viewed merely as a reflector of
a I
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popular opinion, then the time lags for legislative action can
be excused. But if the American people were looking to Congress
for leadership in this difficult period, they could not but have
been disappointed.
4. In reviewing the leadership exercised by the Executive in
this period, we find that the polls often showed public opinion to
be ahead of the President's actions--as distinct from his plans.
There were several reasons for President Roosevelt's hesitancy.
His freedom of action in the field of foreign affairs was hampered
both by the weakness of his political position in domestic affairs
and by the determined opposition of the isolationist bloc in Congress,
which was personally antagonistic towards him. Then, too, the issues
involved all required particularly careful handling, for they were
charged with emotion. Our personal neutrality may have been minimal,
auit opinion on intervention remained hyper-sensitive.
The President's greatest success came in the field of national
defense, an area where the country's security was obviously involved
and therefore one in which public support was not difficult to
obtain. He took the initiative early in defense measures; and the
strengthening of the solidarity of the Western hemisphere was
brought about largely through executive initiative. On the issue
a P
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of the nation's armed strength his measure of public support was
large, although there seemed to be little inclination to make any
sacrifices to strengthen the country. However, in view of the fact
that American self-interest was involved it seems likely that Roosevelt
could have achieved even greater support for a bolder program of
defense if he had taken the lead in pointing out that sacrifice
was necessary.
On the question of aid to England, the PresideCt ttly
worked to bring the nation fully behind the Allies. He had been
against the original Neutrality Acts, and ho worked for their revision
in 1939 and 1941. -To commit the United States more fully to the
Allied cause, he had made the first move with his Destroyer-Bases
agreement, but it is not unlikely that he could have brought about
an even earlier commitment once in the Spring of 1940, it had been
'.demonstrated that all aid to England was in the interests of our
own security. An actual declaration of war, however, would certainly
have provoked a bitter partisan battle in Congress. Moreover, in
view of his difficulty with the selective service extension and the
close vote on the revision of the Neutrality Acts that fall, it is
apparent that such an attempt would, at that time, have been to
no avail. Indeed, it probably would only have damaged his aid pro-
gram by causing nationwide dissension.
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Thus the key to the support enjoyed by Roosevelt in his foreign
policy was the course of international events; and it was his ability
to capitalize upon them which made it possible for him to work
to strengthen the nation and its ties with the Allies. When the
deteriorating international situation forced upon the United States
the realization that its security was at stake, it proved willing
to take certain steps to strengthen itself and England.
That the nation would also have been receptive to a bolder
leadership is entirely possible so long as the nation's leaders
kept in mind that security, rather than idealism, played the foremost
role.
A
U.S. OPINION IN WORLD WAR II
The American public during World War II was primarily concerned
with the progess of the war and the wartime conditions on the home-
front. The significant aspect of wartime public opinion for our
purposes, however, is that which dealt with the postwar world. The
attitudes that were then formed about our allies and the thought
that was given to the problens that would have to be faced once
the war was over were determining factors in the development of
the whole postwar situation.
Of our major allies, China was the one toward which Americans
traditionally had the greatest goodwill, a sentiment that was not
to diminish during the war years when President Roosevelt sought
to establish China as a major power. Amnerican friendliness was
refected in a poll taken early in 1944 which indicated that if we
were able to send food to only one foreign nation, 41 per cent
would want such relief to go to China. Only 18 per cent would send
80
it to England, the second choice.
80. Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-46,op. cit., p. 1106, NORC
January 15, 1944,
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Attitudes toward England, another traditional ally, were by
no means overwhelmingly favorable in the war years. Although in
December of 1941 a majority were ready to aid England at the risk
of becoming involved -in the war, the close association during the
next years was a cause of much friction. Polls taken during the
war indicated that Americans approved British sportsmanlike qualities
but deplored British'class distinctions and "superior attitudes".8 1
As for England's abilities as a fighting partner, Americans consistent-
ly rated her effort to win the war well below that of Russia and
slightly below that of China.82 Despite this evidence of ill will,
the war of necessity brought the United States and Britain much
closer together, and the American public didn't doubt that we would
and must cooperate, with Great Britain in the postwar years. They
were equally certain that she could be depended upon to cooperate
83
with us.
Opinion of Russia underwent many changes between 1939 and 1947.
Americans distaste for Soviet internal policis 'in the thirties
was heightened by the Nazi-Soviet pact and only partially overcome
when the Soviet Union joined the Allies in 1941. Initially we
81. I ,id., pp. 957-8, OPOR June 3, 1942, NORC April 6, 1943
82. See Ibid., pp. 1062-3.
83. Ibid., p. 765, FOR September, 1945. See also pp. 1062-3.
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hesitated to send aid to her, for there seemed little likelihood
that the Soviets could survive the thrusts of the Nazi drives,. and
we feared that the aid would oni.y be lost t.o Hitler's armies. But
in the later years of the war, Americans* came to have great respect and
admiration for Soviet fighting prowess. In fact, in September of
1945 a Fortune poll revealed that the Soviet Union was most admired
by Americans ofor "the way she handles her military campaigns." She
was also generally considered to be the ally working the hardess
84
to win the war. Respect for Soviet military achievements by no
means indicated any readiness to approve of communism although
American opinion gradually came to feel that communism was prefera-
able to a fascism.
In American thinking about relations with Soviet Russia in
the postwar world, a percentage ranging from 38 per cent to 55
per cent in the years 1942-1945 felt that Russia could be trusted.
85
to cooperate with us after the war. In January of 1945,
however, when our armies were sweeping ahead on all fronts
and victory seemed imminent, only 48.3 per cent of the
American people in a Fortune poll felt that America and
84. lbid,, p. 765 FOR September, 1945. See also pp. 1062-3,
85. See Ibid , pp. 370-1.
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Russia would get along with one another better than they had before
86
the war. In that year Gabriel Almond characterized American opinion
as being divided more or less into three equal groups: one "invariably
distrustful" of Russia, a second "fully sold on Russia's amicable
and peaceful intentions," and the third, a middle group, varying
"from a noncommittal view to one of hope and moderate optimism."
By 1946 the first group, hostile to Russia, was gaining adherents,
and some 50 per cent felt that Russia was bent on dominating the
87
world, a percentage growing to 77 per cent in 1948. (See Chart
no. 4 p.42)
World War II forced the American public to concentrate more
attention on foreign affairs than at any time before; but that
Americans were not yet aware that foreign affairs would continue
to play an equally important role in the postwar years is indicated
in a series of polls taken during the war years.
In. 1943 and 1944 those asked what the most important problem*
would be in the next presidential term overwhelmingly replied
unemployment and economic readjustment--58 per cent and 36 per cent.
A "lasting peace" was a poor second, with only 13 per .cent and 12
86. Ibid p. 902, MR January, 1045. See G. A. Almond, cit., p. 94.
87. G. A. Almond, .cit. p. 95.
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per cent naming this the most important problem. From August of
1945 until December of 1946 the per cent considering unemployment
the major problem in the next year dropped from 53 per cent to
2 per cent, as the millions of veterans returning to the home front
were absorbed into an economy starved for peace-time goods. Mean-
while the rash of strikes in the nation' industries had occupied
the country's attention, and labor pro lems grew in importance
from a low of 4 per cent in 1945 to 0 per cent in December of
1946 who felt this to be the most mportant problem ahead. During
this period the problem of .making a lasting peace grew in importance
90
only from 5 per cent to 26 per cent.
The treatment that the Axis nations should receive at the hands
of the victors once the war was ended was a postwar international
problem which received wide consideration in the United States.
Large majorities were agreed that both Japan and Germany should be
disarmed and occupied by .an occupation force for at least several
years. On the general policy that should be followed in dealing
with a conquered peopled Americans made a sharp differentiation
between enemy peoples and their leaders. Although it was commonly
89. Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-46,op. cit.,p. 679.
AIPO August 24, 1943. NORC October, 1944.
90. Ibid, p. 679-690, AIPO August 22, 1945. AIPO December 31, 1946.
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felt that the Axis leaders should be executed, 50 per cent in
91
1944 thought that the German people should be treated fairly.
Only 33 per cent felt this about the Japanese people, 53 per cent
putting more emphasis on their supervision,9 2
This relatively friendly attitude in a time of total war was
also reflected in American attitudes toward the problems of reconstruc-
tion and relief abroad. In 1943 an average of 75 per cent of two
samples expressed their willingness to continue "rationing and other
sacrifices after the war" in order to help feed and rebuild those
93
countries that had been devastated. Fifty-one per cent were
willing to help all countries in need of our aid; 38 per cent held
94
out for just "some" countries. In September of that same year
another 73 per cent agreed that they would be willing to pay more
95
in taxes to make such help possible. A certain amount of self-
interest was revealed, the same poll showing that 78 per cent thought
that helping other countries recover from the war would be the best
96
way to insure prosperity for the United States; and in July of
91. Ibid., p. 1115, NORC February, 1944.
92. Ibid., p. 1118 NORC February, 1944.
93. Ibid., p. 735, NORC January 11, 1943. NORC June 18, 1943.
94. Ibid p. 736, NORC September, 1943.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid., p. 737, NORC March, 1945.
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1945 the nation was about evenly divided on its willingness to
continue the current rate of taxes to make European recovery possible.
Throughout 194Z and 1946 majorities were ready to "put up with the
present shortages of butter, sugar, meat, and other rationed food
S98
produces in order to give food to people who need it in Europe";
but only 33 per cent were willing to make such sacrifices for Japan.
In .1946, rajorities were willing to return to food rationing to
99
send food abroad, .And 70 per cent expressed readiness to have their
100
families eat one fifth less for this purpose.
Despite a general willingness to aid in the relief and re-
construction of less fortunate nations, the American people clung
firrly to the notion that debts incurred by foreign nations should
be repaid. However, although 73 per cent in 1943 and 83 per cent
101
iu September of 1941 felt that the United States should be
repaid for Lend Lease sent abroad during the war years, only 29
102
per cent thought that we would be reimbursed. The firmness
97. Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 9, Fall 1945, p. 383, FOR,
July 27, 1945.
98. Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-46, op. cit., pp. 218-219.
99. See Ibid. p. 219.
100. Ibid, p. 1107, AIPO March 10, 1946.
101. Ibid, p. 413, AIPO, October 1943, AIPO September, 1945.
102. J. Bruner, op. cit., p. 244, AIPO, March 1943.
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with which many held to their belief can be' seen in a 1943 NORC
poll which showed that 70 per cent would not consider Lend Lease
paid in full even if the Allies used the money and goods to save
Amorican lives. Thirty-seven per cent would want to collect even
if it meant a depression in England; 46 per cent would change their
103
minds if such was the case. This attitude towards allied debts
was refleyted in the initial American hostility towards a loan to
Britain immediately after the war. Approval for the first of many
postwar loans was secured only after the necessity for such a measure
had been carefully explained.
The fact that American opinion seemed to reject specific proposals
to make world cooperation viable was no indication of a reluctance
to play a large role in international affairs in the postwar world.
In fact, the most important American attitude to result from the
wartime period a was a new willingness to take a leading role in
international affairs. Early in 1945 "8 persons out .of 10 still
believed that on the day of Pearl Harbor, the President should
,104have been making every effort to keep t e nation out of war.
But these same people had, in polls f Om December of 1941 to October
10S. Ibid., p. 86, NORC, May, 194
104. Bailey, op. cit., p. 79.
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of 1945. come to feel that the United States must take a major
105
part in the international scene. Although few were willing to
enter into agreements with the other nations on disarmament, by
1943 some three fourths of the adult population were in favor of
106
an international police force.0  The idea of a new union of nations
also met with popular approval. Throughout the war years there
was a majority in favor of the United States joining some sort of
successor to the League; and in January of 1943 81.6 per cent
were willing to stay on rationing to feed the starving populations
of the world in order to make a union of nations work. 107 There
was the same measure of approval two and a half years later even
though only 39 per cent felt that such an organization had a good
chance of preventing wars. (44 per cent felt that its chances
108
were fair) The extent to which Americans placed their
faith in the project can be seen in the fact that 64 per cent were
willing to let such an international organization decide on the size'
109
of our Army, Navy, and Air Force. (See chart no. 4 p. 42)
105. See Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion, 1935-46,o .cit., pp. 1055-1058.
196. Ibid., p. 373, NORC January 11, 1943.
107. Ibid., p. 909, CROMC January, 1943.
108. Ibid., p. 910, NORC July, 1945.
109. Ibid., p, 11, NORC July, 1945.
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Although American opinion in World War II was a summary of
wartime opinion and a question predominantly concerned with the
progess of the war itself, the attitudes developed about the post-
war world were, in general, favorable to a policy of international-
ism. The nation was on relatively friendly terms with our fighting
partners. There was no overwhelmingly bitter hatred towards enemy
nations. Americans were sympathetic to the tremendous problems of
postwar reconstruction, realizing at the same time that American
-aid in recovery efforts, besides being a humane obligation., would
serve American interests. On the principle of international coopera-
tion we Americans voiced this assent; and in June of 1945 the
United States signed the United Nations charter confirming the
nation's participation in international affairs and reversing
its pre-war stand towards cooperative action among the nations
of the world.
If this was the state of popular opinion in the United States
up to the closing months of World War II, what, then, was the reason
for the apparent reversal of attitudes in subsequent months as the
United States hastened to disarm while the situation in Europe and
Asia deteriorated?
III
DEMOBILIZATION AND POSTWAR ATTITUDES
The first peacetime problem that the American people had to
face was that of the demobilization of the nation'S gigantic war
machine and the reintegration of millions of men into a peacetime
economy. The speed with which this was accomplished indicated that
the nation considered demobilization purely a domestic problem.
Americans, it seemed, were anxious only to "Bring Our Boys Home"
from the fighting fronts as swiftly as possible and absorb them
into an economy converted to the production of scarce peacetime
goods.' There was no apparent regard for the international conse-
quences attendant upon the reduction of our armed force from 12
million to 1.5 million men within two years and the power vacuum
thereby created.
The point system under which the demobilization was carried
out was conceived prior to the end of hostilities and was put into
effect shortly after victory had been won in Europo. The effect
of the point system was to decimate the ranks in such a way as
to leave the whole of the military strength of the country
seriously weakened; the most experienced men were sent
home first, and the release of men as individuals instead -of as
49
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armed force units riddled division organization.
That there was a widespread support for a speedy return of
soldiers to their homes was mot questioned. Elmer Davis characteriz-
110
ed this support "as nearly unanimous as this country has ever seen
and Morison and Commager, writing of the Congressional elections of
1946, gave as a reason for the Republican victory the universal
111
exasperation at the apparent slowness of demobilization. Rovere
and Schlesinger, while berating the "fatal mistake" of the Great
Demobilization, rationalized that it would, indeed, have been difficult
for the West to maintain -the will to keep its vast armies intact
in advance of any clear demonstration by the Soviet Union of hostile
112intent.
As already noted, the polls taken in the last years of the war
all gave evidence of an intornati-onalist trend in the thinking of
the American public. Was the expressed wish to disarm the Axis
nations and police them with an occupation force for several -years
eonaething that Americans expected other nations to carry out without
American aid? Did they think, as distrust of Russia rose perceptibly
that an army of less than two million men would be sufficient
deterrent to the forces of the Soviet Union? What of the polls
110. Elmer Davis, "Vox populi and Foreign Policy"
Harpers, (June 1952) , p. 72.
111. S. E. Morison and H.S. Commager, The Growth of the American
Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, Vol. 2), p. 791.
112. Rovere and Schlesinger, The General and the President
New York: Farrar, Strauss and Young, 1950, p. 216.
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taken in 1945-1947 which never showed less than 69 per cent in favor
of compulsory military training? How can these polling responseg
be reconciled with a purported eagerness to disband the nation's
armed might? The demonstrationa staged by our troops abroad and
the congressional mail from anxious mothers cannot be denied, but
surely many Americans were aware of the consequences of creating
a power vacuum in Europe and Asia.
Polling questions related to demobilization were begun as early
as 1943, at which time Gallup asked whether the men in the armed
forces should be released after the war whether or not they had
jobs waiting for them. In 1943, 50 per cent of a national sample
and 48 per cent of the families with a member in the service would
113
have kept the troops under arms until there were enough jobs.
A year later the response was somewhat more evenly divided between
those who would release the troops and those who would keep them in
114
the service.1 When asked in the summer of 1944 when most of the
troops serving in Europe could be returned home after the fighting
hod stopped, 36 per cent of the respondents named a time longer
113. Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-1946, . cit., p. 924,
AIPO June 1943.
114. Ibid., FOR, July, 1944.
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than six months and including one and one half years. Forty-two
per cent of the sample thought it would be over one and one half
115
years. At the end of 1944 the predictions were more pessimistic.
When asked when the troops could be sent home after the fighting
had stopped on the two fronts, the responses were as follows:
116 117From Europe From Japan
1 year 21.2 15.8
1-3 yrs. 26.9 23.5
Over 3
years 27.4 33.8
A few months later, as the fighting drew to a close in Europe, 63
per cent felt that even when Germany had been defeated the Navy
could still not afford to release any of its three million men,
although 52 per cent did feel that the Army would be able to relpaso
118
some of its eight million troops.
Quostime nnue attitude3 about the intornatlonal situatiou,
which bore less directly on demobilization also gave some indication
of how Americans felt about the maintonance o'. a strong uilitary
e Early in 1944 a Fortune poll found 73 per cent of a national
115. Ibid., AIO July 18, 1944.
116. Ibid,., p. 452, NYHT December 28, 1944.
117. Ibid,, p. 457 NYETT December 28, 1944.
118. Ibid., p. 924 AIPO February 20, 1945.
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sample favoring an occupation of Germa for several years
By summer a majority not only favored keeping some of our armed
forces there for two years or more- but also favored keeping "as
many men in Germany and other enenty countries as the English
and Russians do.1 2 0 A year lat in the spring of 1945, a
large majority still felt that the United Nations should occupy
121
Japan and Germany for several years, and a smaller majority
wanted the United States to maintain enough strength in both the
Atlantic and Pacific areas to be able to stop singlehandedly any
122
trouble that might arise.
But Administration leaders were certain that the American public
would not tolerate the maintenance of a strong army and navy--as
indeed it had not throughout the nation's history--and the Great
Demobilization was begun. By 1946 the armed services had been
reduced from 12 million to 3 million men. Meanwhile, in 1945,
64 per cent had stated that we would have to keep our occupation
123
troops in Japan for many years-- in fact, when asked for how
119. Leonard W. Doob, Public Opinion and Propaganda (New York:
Henry Holt, 1948), p. 153-
120. Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-1946 , op. cit., p. 451,
AIPO July 18, 1944.
121. Ibid., p. 452, NYHT May 10, 1945.
122. Ibid., p. 944, FOR June 1945.
123. Ibid., p. 457, AIPO October 3, 1945.
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long it would be necessary to police Japan, 24 per cent mentioned
one to five years, and another 39 per cent suggested between 6 and
20 years.124 However', despite this apparent determination to prevent
Japan from disturbing the peace of the world once again, a September
poll found 43 per cent expecting another war within 25 years and an
125
additional 25 per cent anticipating war at least within 50 years.
When questioned specifically about the demobilization, 72
126
per cent in June of 1945 felt that the point system was a fair one.
By September, one month,after hostilities had ceased, 56 per cent
felt that the men were being released fast enough from the Army
and only 23 per cent would have the release rate speeded up. The
views of those with a relative in the Army varied only slightly more
in favor of faster demobilization. Others, with a relative in the
Navy, were somewhat more impatient, with 38 per cent calling for more
rapid demobilization of our naval forces and only 38 per cent
127
satisfied with the current state of affairs. In November there
was slightly more dissatisfaction evident. Now only 50 per cent
124. Ibid.
125. NOuC, September 1945
126. Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-19 4 8, p. cit., p. 925.
127. AIPO, September 20, 1945.
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felt that the Army release system was a fair one, with 40 per cent
feeling that changes were needed. Opinion on the Navy 's method.
was still pretty evenly divided. 1 28
In 1946 there-was no letdown in the desire to continue the
occupation of enemy countries. Polls taken late in the year found
12980 per cent in favor of keeping troops in Europe and Japan.
Even more surprising in view of attitudes tioward demobilization,
was the 60 per cent approval for retaining the several thousand
troops in China while General Marshall attempted to bring peace
to that country. Of the 32 per cent in favor of bringing this
group of men home and the 8 per cent with no opinion, 14 per cent
changed their minds and wore willing to keep them in China when
told that some people thought that Russia might gain control of
130China if the United States forces were withdrawn.
Opinion about demobilization itself did not vary greatly from
the previous year. In the early.part of 1946 about 50 per cent
continued.to feel that the troops were being released fast enough,
and those in favor of a more rapid discharge of men remained
128. AIPO, November 22, 1945.
Undley Cantril, Public Opinion 1935-46, .p. c ., pp. 456,458,
AIPO October 28, 1946, p. 452 AIPO August 28, 1946.
130.. NORC November 1946.
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around 30 per cent, Late in the year, 73 per cent put themselves
down in favor of reducing the size of our aray and navy if other
countries would reciprocate, but only 21 per cent held out any
hope that the others would agree. Sixty-five per cent then felt that
even if othors would agree to reductions, the United States still
needed to keep the largest navy and air force, as a means of keeping
132
the country out of further war.
Meanwhile, a poll in August had found 55 per cent in favor of
133increasing the size of our armed forces, and a later one in
November found 58 per cent wanting to keep them at least at their
current size and 14 per cent favoring an increase regardless of
cost. Less than one in four would reduce the forces in order to
134
save money. By this time, response to the trend question asked
by NORC from August 1945 through Oct er 1946 on whether it would
be more important for the. United S tes to concentrate on "making
the UN so strong that no country would dare start a war or on
making our own defenses so strpng that no country would dare attack
us" had shifted from slight majorities favoring the United Nations
131. Hadley Cantril, Public Opinion, 1935-1946, gp, . 925,
AIPO January 23, 1946.
132. NORC November 1946.
133. NORC August 1946
134. NORC October 1946.
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solution to an emphasis on our own defenses, by 51 to 44 per cent
135
margins.
The public optnion polls have shown us that in the immediate
postwar years the American public had,not altered the basically
internationalist position arrived at during World War II. Thore
was no inclination to'abondon the occupation fof the Axis countries
and, although there was dissatisfaction with the demobilization,
it was not overwhelmingly hostile. The willingness to keep troops
in China when the reasons were pointed out indicated that there
was room for effectively exercised leadership. In view of this it
is interesting to examine just what attempts were made by Admlaletra-
tion leaders to prevent or slow down the demobilization.
According to Harry Truman, despite his personal misgivings
and those of General Eisenhower, ho had no choice but to allow the
disintegration" of the nation's military strength to take' place,
bocause ther was such a glamor for demobilization from the press,
Congress, and the public.
A dictator can use his soldiers as soulless
pawns, but in a government like ours the voice of
the people must be heeded; and the American people
wanted nothing more in that summer of 1945 than to
end the fighting and bring the boys back home. 136
335,.NORC August 1945 October 1946.
136. New YorkTimeo October 21, 1955.
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The fighting in Europe had hardly ended when
pressure began to build up for the release of men
in the armed forces. lith the end of hostilities
in the Pacific, the public demand for the discharge
of the millions of men in the service became insistent.
A 'point' system for determining eligibility for
discharge on the basis of length of service, combat
duty, tine overseas and parenthood credit was put
into effect shortly after VE-Day.
N'Wvctheless the criticisms came. rhnvertholess,
thi diemad for speedier demobilizatica i tiniued to
- ncase. On Sept. 18 1 issued a stctemont assuring
the American people that the return of serviccnon
from the fighting fronts of the world to their
homes was proceedin; fast as the circumstances
permitted. In less one month after the day of
Japan's surrender, the number of men discharged each
day from the Army had risen from 4,200 to more than
15,200. Our soldiers were being returned to civilian
life at a rate in excess of 650 per hour. This rate,
I announced, would be steadily increased to more than
25,000 discharges per day by January, 1946.
Many letters from parents and appeals from
organizations came to me pleading for the release of
various groups. Members of the Congress were reminding
me that their constituencies were bombarding thom with
telegrams and letters. On January 8, 1946, 1 issued
a statoment in which I said that while I rocogni.tod
the anxiety and impatiencE of families, it was jnus not
poosible to dischargn eveozr member of the armori fe'tcer
promptly.
On April 17, 1946, at a press conference in the
White House, I called attention to the fact th.t
discharges in the Army had reached nearly 7,000,000.
I termed this 'the most remarkable demobilization in
the history of the world, or 'disintegration', if you
want to call. it that.'
Our frenzied demobilization, in fact,' grew out of
our antagonism toward maintaining a large standing army.
There was only one alternative, in my opinion, and that
was a prepared soldier-citizenry.
What a nation can do or mist do begins with the
willingness of its people to shoulder the burden. In
137. I3?M.., October 27, 1955
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1945-1946 the American people had chosen to scuttle
their military might. I was against hasty and excess-
ive demobilization at the time, and stated publicly-
that I was; and General Eisenhower, then Army Chief
of Staff, spoke out against it also. The prcsa and
Congress., however, drowned us out .138
President Truman in his public statements following thn
victory in Japan repeatedly declared that it would be necessary
for the United States to remain militarily strong. However, since
he envisioned the armed strength of the nation being sustained by
means of a selective service, he made no strong muove to stop the
demobilization of the seasoned troops at hand. He apparently
assumed that the maintenance of a strong well-trained force was not
immediately necessary. Little more'than a month after the surrender
of Japan he stated:
I think we should all be very clea.r about one
thing. An impression has spread that the speed of
demobilization is governed by our future needs3 for
occupation and other forces. That is, -of course,
not true.
No one now can accurately forecast wiat thoso
needs are going to be. Our earlier estimates sre being
constantly revised, .
Carrying on our demobiliiation as rapidly as we
can--which we are now doing--we shall not really face
the problem of .the size or makeup of the occupation
forces until next spring... 3 9
In the public pronouncements of administration lead irs there
138. Ibid, February 7, 1955.
139. Ibid, September 20, 1945.
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was ample evidence that these men felt that a strong America and
some sort of national military training was of paramount importance.
Yet these were the men who had'formulated the point cystem vhich
was rapidly bringing about a tremendous reduction in America's
strength. While General Marshall in particular was extremely blunt
in his warning of the raveness of our weakened position, ho himself
had announced in September of 1945, in answer to what the T'p
called "virtually a summons" before members of both Houses of
Congress, that the point requirements had been lowered and the boys
would be sent home even faster.
The concern of other government leaders .is reflected in Secretary
yorrestal ' records of high government meetings at the time. In
October of 1945 those present at a State-War-Navy meeting were all
in agreement that the hasty demobilization of the armed forces
was of grave danger to the country. At this time Mr. Forreatal
suggested that the President make the Soviet attitude cnovn to the
public, but Secretary of State Byrnes was fearful thet this would
140
damage Soviet-American relations and nothing was done. At a
Cabinet meeting three months later Acheson was gravely concerned
about the effect of demobilization upon our foreign policy, and
140. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking
Press, 1951)', p. 102.
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Forrestal suggested a nation-wide press and radio campaign to impress
upon the country the seriousness of the situation-- to which the
141
President agreed. But again nothing was done to halt the rapid
dispersal of our armed strongth.
Some Conclusions on Postwar.Opinion
The disparity between public opinion as recorded by the polls
and the executive concept of public attitudes permits us to make
several conclusions:
1. The point system which permitted Harry Truman's "frenzied
demobilization" was not an accurate reflection of public popinion.
The system, conceived before the war had ended, was based not
upon recorded public. attitudes at the time but upon what government
leaders thought that public opinion would be once the fighting had
stopped. The new internaticnalist trend in the thinking of the
American people, the fear of another war, the desire to occupy
enemy countries for several years, the realization that troops would
not be sent home immediately--all these public attitudes revealed
in wartime polls were disregarded by the Administration. Later,
the willingness of a sizable majority to keep troops in China,
especially when the reason for such a move was given, was further
evidence that public opinion would not have been entirely adverse
141. Ibid., pp. 128-129.
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to the maintenance of substantial armed strength had the need been
explained.
2. Congress let itself be influenced by a vocal minority.
The pressures that President Truman spoke of were those upon
Congressmen in the form of mail and pressure groups which have seldom
proveu representational. American mothers were impatient for their
sons' return; and no uoe had given thew vufficient reason why they should
not be. Few citizens, or Congressmen, cared to take such an unpopular
stand as to suggost that perhaps the soldiers were being sent home
too fast when no leader in the government had come forward to pro-
test the method and speed of the demobilization. Congressmen,
reluctant to resist the pressure of their heavy mail, talked instead
of the unassailable postion of the United States as a world pvor
and joined in the popular clamor to reduce that power.
3. The failure to maintain a strong America was a failure of
leadership not of an unwilling public.
What wan needed was an intensive effort on the part o.f the
Administration to explain to the American public the consequences
of the tremendcas reduction of military manpower before adequate
roplacononts could be made ready. President Truman pleaded for
a strong America through a vigorous selective service program,
but he permitted the current national military strength to drain
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away at a phenomenal rate. Throughout the United States, faith in
both the United Nations and the Atom bomb seemed to make conventional
power unnecessary as well as expensive. When the President himself
admitted that he did not know what the occupation needs would be,
and thus showed his uncertainty of the job, requirements in convention-
al power terms, he could scarcely expect his countrymen to know
what force would be needed. His failure to outline the country's
tasks realistically made it impossible for the public to understand
why a large armod force was still necessary--and ono no could be
expected to approve a large armed service for no apparent reason.
In view of the tragic absence of strong national leadership,
what was remarkable was not that 30 per cent would have speeded up
the demobilization but that 50 per cent felt that it was boing
carried out rapidly enough.
IV
THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE
Two years of peace brought little relief from the chaos of
1945. Fighting continued in many parts of the world, and in Europe
a kind of paralysis prevailed. Not only was the immense problem
of reconstruction still to be faced; the spirit of cooperation
that existed during the war years had all but vanished. Hostility
towards Russia had increased rapidly throughout 1946, and now
Europe s economic problems were heightened by political disunity.
The situation demanded a leader and a plan, but England and France,
the war's victors, were themselves in no postion to exercise the
kind of bold leaddrship necessary; and the United States, the
only Western nation capable of rendering vital economic aid, seemed
to have withdrawn to the far side of the Atlantic.
In the United States few citizens could have been unaware of
the crisis in Europe as disturbing reports poured in from every
European capital. But, although American suspicion of Russia was
widespread, there was sti-ll a tendency to hope that peace was not
entirely lost, and a kind of wishful thinking encouraged by the
lack of leadership in the immediate postwar years, when little
effort was made to impress upon the American people the lact that
international cooperation and the economic viability of Europe
63
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were partly America's reponsibility. The devastion of World War II
had left only the United States in a postion oto act but,would she?
The steady worsening of the European crisis certainly did not
pass unobserved in Washington, but the administration too seemed
paralyzed. The numerous crises that arose in the first two years
after the war were met separately, not with a cohesive plan. Although
officials must have noted a world wide pattern in Russia's actions,
there was little attempt to meet the challenge with anything but
a piecemeal approach. Part of the answer lay in an unwillingness
to antagonize Russia for fear of making the situation worse. Domestical-
ly, the political situation was uncertain. Harry Truman had little
of the popularity of his predecessor; and for the first time in
more than a decade the Republicans, whose aim was to reduce govern-
ment expenditures, controlled Congress. Thqre was a general assump-
tion that the voters were waiting only till 1948 to elect a Republi-
can president. The time could not have been more inauspicious
for new demands upon America's economic and .political resources.
In light of the deteriorating economic and political situation
in Europe, the British decision to withdraw from Greece by March 31,1947
and cease financial assistance to Turkey could not have seemed
particularly serious to most Americans. But to government observers
it was open acknowledgement of the decline of the British power on
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which the United States had traditionally relied to maintain the
balance of power in Europe. With only Russia in a postion of
strength, the United States must step in if it wanted to prevent all
of Europe from falling to communism. The condition in Greece was
not one that promised a simple solut tion. The British had been
financing a weak, corrupt Greek .government against attacks by
communist guerrilla forces which had j et launched a heavy offonsive.
Economic and military collapse sceme imminent. In Turkoy, Soviet
pressure threatened the independen of the Turkish nation. The
/
situation was not one in which t American people would be anxious
to become involved.
The decision to take over the British commitment in Gr.eece and
assume a major role in the Near East was made by the President and
his advisors in the face of a highly adverse domestic situation.
It was a decision that took great courage. Russia was firmly entrenched
in all of the Balkans but for Greece and in all of Central Europe
to the Elbe. 'The weakened British who were gradually withdrawing
from many of their Asian outposts, could no longer afford to sustain
the Greek government and help with the development of Turkey. If
the Russians were to be denied another satellite, the United States
must come to the aid of the Greek and Turkish people to prevent the
economic collapse of their nations.
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On March 12, 1947 President Truman requested of Congress $400
million for aid to Greece and Turkey and authorization to send
military and civilian personnel to supervise this aid and assist
in reconstruction.
The momentous nature of President Truman's request was apparent.
He was not only asking for a large loan to bolster two badly weakened
economies but also enunciating a new "policy of the United States
to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation
by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The Truman Doctrine,
as it came bo be called, was the government's answer to Soviet
expansion. The necessity for such action was not questioned among
top government leaders; in fact, the near unanimity of support in
government circles was as remarkable as the attempt made to mobilize
congressional and popular opinion behind this unprecedented action.
Before the President made his request to Congress, he appointed
a committee to inform the nation's leaders of the need for a bold
foreign aid program. Congressional leaders were also called in to
be briefed on the world situation. At the first meeting of the
President and top State Department and Congressional leaders, Senator
Vandenberg insisted that the President present the issue frankly
to the American people if he wished the bipartisan support of
67
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Congress ; and it was the aaministration's acceptance of Vandenburg's
advice which enabled the program to be carried through successfully.
Pubic reaction to the Truman Doctrine was-widespread, and the
volume of comment tremendous. The discussion in general tended to
center about Greece, a country more familiar to the American people
than was Turkey and the country where the situation was more critical.
Fortunately, State Department studies of press and radio opinion
have made it possible to study both the articulate comment and the
opinion 'registered in the numerous public opinion polls.
Press Comment
In the months prior to the President's message there had been
increasing dismay in the nation's press over the military situation
in Greece, although no approval of the character of the Groek govern-
ment. As the 3ritish withdrew from the area there was some demand
that the United States asend economic aid to Greece, but imost
commentators warned against a military commitment. Popular awareness
of the crucial nature of the Greek situation was minimal, and the
atmosphere was scarcely favorable to a deeper involvement in the
area.
The initial response to the proposed sending of both military
and economic aid to Greece and Turkey was one of generally strong
142. Joseph M. Jones. q teg& Wfe) , Now York: Viking Press,
1955, see p. 142.
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approval in the presa and on the radio. Support for the President
was not restricted to any one group, and virtually all recognized
the significance of the step that the country'was taking. Op-
position was present, however, and soon a nationwide debate began.
Strong liberals and right wing isolationists joined forces in a
very vocal minority to protest the President 's plan and its implications
for Americad future role in world affairs. But two such diverse
groups could not unite on any alternative program.
On one hand, Henry Wallace and his followers feared that a
hardening of our policy towards Russia would lead to war. On the
other hand, isolationistn were dismayed at the prospect of an
American commitment to an active role on the international scene.
Extreme liberals were concerned that the Truman Doctrine was im-
perialistic and were especially unhappy about the provisions for
military assistance. Their conservative allies were upset at the
cost of such a' progaram and the likelihood that this would be the
first of many. Fearing that our economy could not stand the strain,
they would have much preferred to leave the problem to the British,
especially as Turkey had not even been n ally in the war and
was not visibly on point of collapse. Such views were evident in
the pages of the Jackson, Mississip Daily News:14 3
143. Jackson, Mississippi Daily/News, March 16, 1947.
69
Who shall say that the people of any nation
may not have Communism if that is what they desire?
If the ideological and military conflict with Russia
is inevitable, another little nation or two gone
Communistic won't prove to be the deciding factor
in an atomic war.
Since they are evidently determined to engage
in the exporiment,wouldn't it be better to let the
nations of Europe get their bellyfull of Communism
and thereby learn the folly of such a plan of govern-
ment?
Efforts to combat Communism in the Balkans with
American dollars are not likely to succeed.
Then when we have bankrupted ourselves trying to
bail out the staggering nations of Europe, Communism
will have a field day in the United States.
With nothing to show for 'our immature generosity
xert more enlls Zor. I6.p, the time ha *an io cali
a halt befor we join other nations in the international
breadline.
The QArIt on the other hand, was more disturbed by the
military implications o. the propoed poliey v
The President now asks the United States to take
the law into its own hands. In total disregard
of -our solemn pledges to maintain international
peace by collective action, he proposes to meet the
speculative threat of Russian aggression by an
overt threat of American military power .
- Mr. Truman 's excitement over this -'crisis' is
not rooted in pure altruism. It reflects the militaristic
ideology that has become ascendant in his adrinistra-
tion, which is now dominated by military minded
statesmen headed by himsef and his new secretary
of state....
The American people are not ready to cast their
traditions and ideals on the scrap heap. They
want to help the stricken peonles of the world, but they
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do not want to dominate them. They are willing
to give millions for humanitarian relief, millions--
yes, and billions if necessary--for the support
of the United Nations in the discharge of its
world mission against every threat of war, but
not one dollar for empire *144
There were several issues that troubled both supporters
and opponents of President Truman 's proposal. 'Internationalists
were particularly disturbed that the Truman Doctrine and its
aid to Greece and Turkey would by-pass the United Nations, perhaps
seriously damaging the prestige o2 the now world organization;
although the UN was in no way equipped to handle an emergency of this
sort; it was not until Senator Vandenberg added an amendment to the aid
bill that cpposition was destroyed. This amendment provided for
an end to the ai'd once termination had been requested by either
the UN or Greece and Turkey or if the President determined that
the objectives of the aid had been accomplished.
While this quieted most objections about the United States,
unilateral action, those who were disturbed about the character of
the governments of both Greece and Turkey were never entirely
satisfied. Naturally there was strong reluctance to support
reactionary governments. But most commentators came to feel that
in view of the situation in'Eastern Europe, there would be a better
chance for the development of democracy under the current regimes.
144. Christian Century, March 26, 1947
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But there was also the implied assumption that communism
could be fought with Aaerican dollars. While the Right was concerned
at the demands imposed upon the country's economy, others felt
that in a battle for men's minds the dollar was a very limited
weapon. Criticism was also leveled at the President's speech for
its failure to spell out in detail the implications of the proposed
program. Some feared that it meant an ideological crusade against
commu nism everywhere. Others felt it to be only a practical pro-
gram to stop the imperialistic expansion of Soviet Russia in those
areas where her territorial ambitions were clearly defined. All
wanted more information.
Despite sharp opposition by a minority, the press expressed
general support for the Truman Doctrine, and press support increased
as the seriousness of the situation became more generally known.
An editorial in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette the day after the
President's speech gives the approach taken by many of the program's
supporters.
The course President Truman has recommended that
Congress follow in providing assistance for Greece
and Turkey represents a basic reversal in traditional
American foreign policy.
When the alternatives to this course are considered,
however, one concludes that President Truman has re-
commended a radical departure in the best interests
of the Western democracies.
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To permit the collapse of Greece, and subsequently
Turkey, would be to invite Russian domination of areas
vital to our security. The only way to prevent the
collapse is to assume the financial burden soon to be
put down by Britain. Ours is the only country capable
of taking over.
We would much prefer to see this and other issues
handled within the United Nations, the agency created
for just such a purpose.
But we cannot escape the fact that at present the
United Nations is not equal to the situation.
With so much at stake for what remains of the world's
democracies, with the need so urgent to protect our
own enormous investment in the victory so recently won,
President Truman has pointed to the logical choice for
this country. We hope that Congress will accept his
recommendations in the non-partisan spirit in which
they were made. 14 5
Public Opinion
The support for both military and economic aid in press and
radio comment was not immediately reflected in the surveys of
popular opinion taken at the time. Polls taken at the end of
March and early April did show a high degree of awareness of the
program. By April third some 83 per cent stated they had heard
146
of Congress's discussion of the matter. The reason for such a
program was thought by one third to be humanitarian. Almost half
147
felt that it had been conceived in order to stop Russia. Not
148
until late in June was the humanitarian concept gained, was
145. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, March 13, 1947.
146. NORC, April 3, 1947.
147. Jones, op. cit., p. 179.
148. NORC June, .1947.
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the measure of support for these two reasons about evenly divided.
It was evident that there was also some question about the character
of the governments that would be aided. A majority were uncertain
that the governments of Greece and Turkey enjoyed the support -of
the majority of their citizens.
On the general priciple of aid for the two countries, 60 per
,15 0cent initially approved funds to help Greece "get back on her feet."
Two weeks after Truman's speech some 56 per cent would specifically
approve $250 milliQn aid for Greece, with 32 per cent in opposition.
151No difference appeared between Republicans and Democratn. Thoro
were 49 per cent also behind the $150 million grant to Turkey, where
152the danger did not seem imminent. By April those in favor of
money to help Greece recover from the war ranged around 67 per cent;15 3
and in June, while the support for Greek aid dropped to 55 per cent,
the per cent in outright opposition had also dropped to 19 per cent.
At this time, 26 per cent had either no opinion or gave a qualified
154
answer.
On the military aspects of the aid program, public opinion
polls showed a marked lack of enthusiasm. When the question was
149. AIPO, March , 1947.
150. NORC, March 22, 1947.
151. AIlO, March 28, 1947.
152. Ibid.
153. SRC April, 1947.
154. NORC June, 1947.
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first asked, a majority (48 per cent to 38 per cent) opposed military
supplies to Greece even when the avowed purpose, as stated in the
155
question, was to put down communist attacks; and by .April dis-
156
approval had grown to 53 per cent. At the end of 1947, however,
when military aid had become governamenE policy, 45 per cent were
157favorable and 38 per cent opposed, When questioned about military
advisors for Greece, initial response to a small survey was favor-
158
able (47 per cent to 41 per cent), although a week or so later
a larger survey fond 54 per cent disapproval. In the caso of
Turkey, there was a more even division. There the small survey
found 43 per cent (against. 41 per cent) wanting military supplies
160
and expe'ts sent to strengthen Turkey against Russian prosnure.
The fact that this early poll included mention of both "oxperts"
and "supp1 e-s may have been the reason for approval for helping
Turk&ey, as the real opposition was to military supplies. A few weeks
later the larger survey revealed 55 per cent opposed to sending our
military experts to train the Turkish army and 54 per cen*
155. NOAC, March 19-22, 1947.
156. NORC)April, 1947.
157. Puolic Opinion Quarterly, Vol XII, Fall, 1948, p. 543, NORC
December, 1947.
158. N3RC, March 19-22, 1947.
159. AIPO, March 28, 1947.
160. NORC, March 19-22, 1947.
161. AIPO, March 28, 1947.
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opposed to sending military supplies. In this later April period
64 per cent believed that "the Greek overnment in Greece is in
danger of being overthrown by the nists". Only 56 per cent
believed "Turkey in danger becAus of Russian pressure" this no
doubt partly explains the slightly greater approval for sending
military supplies to Greece.16 3
NORC found that when questioned about the risk of war involved
in furnishing military aid to the two nations, 52 per cent felt
that war would be more likely if we provided military supplies
164
while 27 per cent thought it less likely. Two weeks later the
165
percentages had varied by only a few points. Meanwhile Gallup
found that 54 per cent thought that war would not be a likely
166
result if we provided only money.
An interesting poll by Gallup appeared later, in September,
in the Washington Post dealing more directly with US intervention
in Greece. A large majority favored. further US moves to help Greece
-162. .1jaC(, tpri&l, 1947
163. NORC, April 7-9,. 1947.
164. NORC, March 19-22, 1947.
165. NORC, April 3, 1947.
166. AIPO, March 28, 1947.
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in her struggle against Russia if the aid planned proved insufficient.
Four courses of action were then proposed. The largest per cent
(40) would cooperate with the UN and tell Russia that any further
moves would be'considered war against the rest of the world. The
next proposal, with 28 per cent of the respondents behind it, was
to send US troops to the Greek border in cooperation with the UN.
167
Backing for the other suggestions was negligible. Support for
those uilitant proposals was given despite the initiAl reluctance
to srind even military goods.
The administration of the Truman Doctrine by American civilian
rxperts was widely favored by the American public. At the same
time, a majority felt that the UN would be able to handle the matter
effectively by itself and that the UN should take a more active
part in solving the problem of Greece and Turkey. Although this
seemed to indicate that phe American people were not willing to
shoulder the necessary responnibility, other polls showed them not
unaware of the now role that the United States was assuming. A
decidedly large majority was conscious of England's declining role, 168
and there was ample majority support for the new turn our foreign
167. Washingto Post, AIPO, September 24, 1947.
168. NORC, April 3, 1947.
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policy had suddenly taken. Public approval for the manner in which
Harry Truman was carrying outithe duties of the presidential office
shot up from 48 per cent in February to 60 per cent in March.
By April 63 per cent counted themseives "generally satisfied" with
the foreign policy of the United States.1 7 0 All three polls were
no doubt directly related to public attitudes toward the Truman
Doctrine. Other polls taken after the President's message ound g
general agreement on a olicy of attempting to put down Communist-
staged armed revolts in other foreign countries. 171 On aid in
general, 71 per cent approved the continued spending of "large
sums to aid war torn countries. 172
The vigorous attempt made by the Administration to win
support for a revolutionary step in the nation's foreign policy
was most significant in its iong-run implications. By frankly
revealing the deterioration that had taken place in Western Europe.
The Administration largely overcame press and radio opposition to
the Truman plan; and in the wake of the Administration's efforts
the public showed that it was willing, as it had been during World
War II, to help European nations recover from the devastation of
- 139 TPO, February, 1947, March, 1947.
170. SRC, April 1 1947.
171. NORC, March 19-22, 1947.
172 SRC, April, 1947.
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the war. There was general approval for the principle of the a*c
bill even though the public was still unwilling to risk involvment
in any military action. Popular support for a now foreign policy
was strong--and the way was paved for further moves.
VTHE MARSHALL PLAN
The Truman Doctrine was the first stage in the revision of
United States policy. Although it proposed in outline a broad
new concept, it s.iggcstod specisio steps to remedy the iW'.s of only
two nations. Although Europe was heartened that the United States
was anxious that no further nations succumb to Russian pressure,
the President 's speech had not suggested how the United States was
prepared to salvage the economy of the rest of Europe. The peoples
of Europa waited for further proposals.
American commentators, toowaited for a plan of action based
on the new principles. Thus once the problem of aid to Greece and
Turkey had been handed over to Congress, Under Secretary Acheson
spelled out in greater detail the problems ahead. Early in May,
in a speech at Cleveland, Mississippi, the decretary told the
Delta farmers of the grim economic situation that prevailed through-
out Europe:
L a.ast winter's blizzard did show up the extremely
narrow margins of human and national subsistance which
prevail in the world today, margins so narrow that a
blizzard can threaten populations with starvation and
nations with bankruptcy and loss of independence. Not
only do human beings and nations exist in narrow economic
margins, but also human dignity, human freedom, and
democratic institutions. It is one of the principle
aims of our foreign policy today to use our economic
and financial resources to widen these margins. It is
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necessary if we are to preserve our own freedoms
necessary if we are to preserve our own freedoms,
and our own democratic institutions. It is necessary
for our national security. And it is our duty and
privilege as human beings. 17 3
And in New England, a Connecticut paper commented:
....To restore the non-Soviet world economically,
is, to put it mildy, a task of formidable complexity
and difficulty. But -ie shall have to face tho facts.
Only if the western world can be rehabilitated to the
point at which it can once more sustain itself will we
ourselves be able to prosper and perhaps survive. 174
In Washington, work went ahead on the problem of an over-all
plan to salvage the European situation. At the same time, through-
out the spring of 1947, debate in the press and on the radio on
the problem of aid increased the pressure upon Washington officials
to work out a practical, integrated solution based upon the now
principles already sketched by the President and Secretary Acheson.
Although Senator Vandenberg had declared that there would be no
new foreign aid programs that session, Europe's problems could
not wait upon the U.S. Congress. Thus, on June 5, 1947, at Harvard
University's commencement, Secretary of State Marshall declared:
It is logical that the United States should. do
whatever it is able to assist in the return of normal
173. J. Jones, o . t., p. 30.
174. Hartford (Conn.) Courant, May 10, 1947.
1economic health in the world, without which there
can be no political stability or assured peace. Our
policy is directed not against any country or doctrine
but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.
Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy
in the world so as to permit the emergence of political
and s6cial conditions in which free institutions can
exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be
on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any
assistance that this government may render should
provide a cure rather than a palliative. Any government
that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will
find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the
United States government. Any government which maneuvers
to block recovery of other countries cannot expect help
from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties,
or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order
to profit therefrom politically will encounter the
oppostion of the United States.1 75
Press Comment
The Marshall Plan for a cooperative effort between the United
States and the nations of Europe to restore the productive power
of the war-shattered economies was, again, a revolutionary step.
It was public acknowledgment by the U.S. government that our welfare
was interdependent with that of Europe, that the United States
had reponsibility for the restoration of Europe's economic health.
Unlike the enunciation 'of tha Truman Doctrine, Secretary
Marshall's speech was not a dramatic announcement of a new crisis.
In fact, it was the subsequent excited response from the capitals
175. J. Jones, op. cit., pp. 34-35.
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Europe that aroused many Americans. But its total impact was no
less, and public response was strong. In the press and among radio
commentators support was immediate. The New York Herald Tribune,
in one of hundreds of editorials that appeared immediately through-
out the country summarized the proposal:
Secretary of State Marshal was presenting a
starkly but hopefully realistic picture of Europe's
problem and the role which the United States must play
in solving that problem.
Mr. Marshall's speech was directed at two objectives--
to a divided Europe and to a puzzled United States.
Europe must prepare a master plan, one which will re-
cognize that American resources are not inexhaustive
and that political panaceas will not aid their re-
covery. The United States mst be prepared to assume
heavier burdens, for longer than it had hoped or expected,
as an investment in restoring the world to sanity and
good economic health. To carry through this complicated
operation will require the best efforts of the best
brains, here and abroad, as well as a broad public
acceptance within the United States of the necessity
of the program and confidence in the efficiency with
which it is to be carried out. Mr. Marshall has
evidently embarked upon the organization of such a
program which will fulfill these requirements and he
has make a most encouraging beginning. 1 7 6
The far reaching support for the plan (editoriai support
ranged around 10 to 1) was based on its new approach to the problem
of reconstruction. It signaled the end to piecemeal planning.
Europe was to be treated as a unit--as it must be if its resources
176. New York Herald Tribune, June 7, 1947.
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were to be mobilized effectively,. and, better yet, it was not
another dollar handout; it left the initiative to the nations
of Europe. It had answered objections to the Truman Doctrine by
putting the emphasis on economics rather than ideology. If Russia
did no choose to cooperate, the onus would be upon her.
Although the strongest criticism came from those who felt
that Europe would be unable to wait for a complicated plan and urged
instead that funds be granted immediately, there was still a limited
but adamant group opposed to the whole idea. This group of hard
core opponents of the Truman Doctrine was not appeased by this
latest approach--those on the Right still fearing the drain upon
the economy of the United States, and those on the Left fearing
further provocation of Russia. Qualified supporters, like the
Wall Street Journal, realized that the need was great but felt that
the United States would be unable to afford the cost.
Throughout the summer, and indeed until the European Recovery
Plan Act was passed in the spring of the following year, support
and enthusiasm for Secretary Marshall's proposals remained high
in recorded comment. Senator Vandenberg's early suggestion that an
inventory of this nation's resources be taken and President Truman's
appointment of three committees on June 22 to study foreign aid were
welcomed as sound practical approaches. Meanwhile, the leading
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papers reported fully on all developments in the planning; and
by the end of the summer the discussion had centered upon how, not
whether, the aid was to be sent. President Truman did not submit
his $17 billion bill for European Recovery to Congress along with
his recommendations for its passage until December 19th of that
year. In the interim, the Paris Conference of the 16 nations in
September was observed with great interest, and its conclusionn
met with favor--although it was felt that the sum they had requested
was large. The New York Times was particularly enthusiastic:
Not until now have the Arerican people had an opportunity
to .ook at the other side of the lodger--that side setting
forth concretoly what the Plan means in terms of
Europe s cooperation and Itroduction and reconstruction.
We believe that these will constitute a genuinely
thrilling relevation to those who had been thinking
of this underwriting opera.ion as simply so nich more
stopgap financial aid.177
About this time the leading paper in the East began to urge
that emergency aid be made available si.ace the Marshall Plan could
not be put into effect for many months anLd Europe needed help
immediately after the devastating winter of' 1947 and the subsequent
drought. Increasing impatience with the slowness of the government
to deal with the European situation and the lack of information wore
somewhat abated by President Truman's call for a special session
177. New York Times, September, 1947
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of Congress and the various gove Wnt reports on our national
resources and aid problems that came in from the committees the
President had appointed in June. Press and radio enthusiasm continued
undiminished all during the fall months, although the setbacks received
by the proposed interim aid measure, introduced pessimism about the
eventual passage of the Marshall Plan itself. Each week major newspapers
carried several editorials urging passage of aid, and- radio commentators
were tabulated at about 12 to 1 favor of the measure.
Finally, in December, an interim aid bill was passed by Congress,
and Truman then sent the Marshall Plan Act before it for consideration-
accompanied by a plea for its passage. His proposal for $17 billion
over a four-year period received wide national support despite the
size of the request. Division came, however, over the President's
proposal for its administration under the State Department. During
January the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard more than 90
persons express largely favorable views on the measure in well publicized
hearings; but discord over the proposals for the administration of
aid continued. The Senate Committee's preparation of its own bill met
with approval as it did not change the President's to any large extent,
and the decision to set up an independent agency to administer the
program and. to request funds for only a 12 month period was widely
welcomed.
By March the Commniist Coup in Czechoslovakia and new Russian
demands upon Finland, as well as impending elections in Italy, added
86
greatly to the sense of urgency with which European recovery
was regarded. Where economic reasons had been predominant before,
now stopping communism became an important aim. Criticism of the
Administration's features was almost nil. The Marshall Plan Act
passed both Houses on April 3, 1948--and was widely heralded through-
out the nation.
Opinion of National Groups
Before we turn to the public opinion polls of this period, we
may look first at the support received by the Plan from national
organizations, which are in many cases the link between the people
and Congress. Here again, as in the nation's press, we find the
support of a doided majority. Some 48 national groups put them-
selves on record as favoring the Plan, while only four recorded
opposition. The character of this support ranged from the National
Grange to the ADA, with only business organizations notably lacking
in enthusiasm, although strongly supporting the principle of aid.
The opinion of the business groups was cautious, urging more dis-
cussion of the various technical aspects of the program. The CIO
and the AFL, on the other hand, were strongly in favor of large
scale aid, though not necessarily the Marshall Plan. Of the farm
organizations, the leaders of the major groups voiced support
despite the fact that much of the farm population remained unconvinc-
ed of the need for a plan. A poll taken in the early months after
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Marshall's speech by the Wallace Farmer and Iowa Homestead found
32 per cent of the nation's farmers against lending $5 billion.
a year to get the program started and an additional 39 per cent
178generally opposed. Support, however, did come from the major
veterans'and women's groups. The American Legion Platform called
it the "most important instrument" for dealing with the spread of
communism. Religious organizations were notably enthusiastic about
relieving the distressed conditions on the continent. Not one
of the special interest groups took issue with the general
principles which underlay 'a program of extensive aid to Europe.
Public Opinion
When we review public attitudes toward the Marshall Plan,
we dfind that they bore a direct relation to knowledge of the
Secretary's proposal. As knowledge of the Plan spread, support
grew. Not until the autumn of 1947, however, was more than half
179
the population aware of the Marshall Plan; and only one-fifth
180
realized that it was based upon the principle of self-help de-
spite efforts of government officials to make that point clear
and the relatively large volume of press coverage. At this time,
in October of 1947, the marked disparity between educational
178. State Department Report 'covering June-October 1947.
179. AIPO, November 2, 1947.
180. NOkC, October,1947.
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groups was apparent. Seventy-five per cent of the college-educated population
had heard of the plan, a percentage dropping to 47 per cent and
18128 per cent among the High School and Grade School graduates.
During the winter and into the spring of 1948, when the program
was being debated in Congress, awareness of the plan did grow to
around 80 per cent--with 98 per cent of the college group and 61
per cent of the least educated group cla ming knowledge of the
182
aid bill. At this time support for the Plan was also at its
highest. It is important to note, h ever, the distinction between
an "aware" and an "informed" citiz n.183 Those "informed" about the
Marshall Plan, and thus able to discuss it with some knowledge,
184
were only counted at about 14 per cent as late as February, 1948.
It is also important to note that there was a distinction
between those in favor of foreign aid in general and those who
were behind the Marshall Plan specifically, although the Marshall
Plan itself consistently had many more supporters than opponents.
In the month following Secretary Marshall's speech at Harvard,
Gallup polls estimated that of the population that had heard of
181. NORC, March, 1948.
182. NORC, October, 1947.
183. See Lester Markel, Public 0pinion and Foreign policy, New York,
Harpers, Chapter 2, pp. 49-56.
184. Ibid., p. 52.
89
his proposals some 57 per cent were in- favor and only 21 per cent
185
opposed. Of the "aware"group 55 per.cent also put themselves
on record as favoring an advance of "as much as $5 billion a year
so that European countries could buy what they need here." This
186
time 35 per cent objected. However, 50 per cent-were decidedly
unwilling to pay more taxes to let European nations buy what they
needed in the United States. In this case, only 41 per cent approved
187
of a tax raise.
By the autumn or- 1947, when an increasingly large per cent
had become aware of the debate over the foreign aid program, NORC
found 80 per cent behind the sending of "machinery and other supplies
to help get the factories and farms [of Western Europe] running again.
The strength of this support became apparent when the respondents
were asked if they would still approve if it meant shortages of "things
you want to buy ." Approval then dropped from 80 per cent to 49 per
189
cent. One month later, in November, only 29 per cent of a total
sample approved the Marshall Plan in particular, although 47 per cent
190
of those who had heard of it previously were in favor. At the
185. AIPO, July 23, 1947.
186. Ibid.
187. Ibid.
188. NORC, October, 1947.
189. NORC, October, 1947.
190. AIPO, November, 1947.
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end of the yeir, before President Truman had laid the, program
before Congress, approval was up once again. Now 56 per cent of
191
those 64 per cent who had heard of the plan favored it.
The strength of this support had mounted, too, for 49 per cent
favored the plan (against 40 per cent in opposition) even if it was
to-mean a postponement of a tax reduction, although slightly over
half prescribed conditions of some sort (i.e., supervision or repay-
192
ment) in their approval. In a breakdown by degree of information,
another gallup poll asking for opinions on "lending Western European
nations liko England, France, Holland, and Norway c. $20 billion
over the next 4 :years to be spent for goods bought in this country"
read like this: 19 3
Favor Oppose Qualified N.O.
Best informed 50 28 12 10
Less informed 51 31 10 8
Vaguely informed 49 32 10 9
Heard of but didn't 44 38 5 -13
know purpose
Once the aid program was presented in Congress, a large percentage
of all groups classified by education were aware of the debate and
the Senate hearings in particular. At this time, in January, 51
per cent said that they were satisfied with the President's efforts
191. AIPO, December 7, 1947.
192. NOReIV December 1947.
193. Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XII, Spring 1948, p. 172, AIPO,
December 7, 1947.
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194to help Europe recover from the war, and another 70 per cent in
a Fortune Poll expressed their approval of the Marshall Plan.19 5
More general approval for this program was tabulated by Gallup when
he found 40 per cent in favor of the bill and a higher 56 per cent
196
approval among those who had previously heard of the program.
By late March approval was registered by 51 per cent of the populations
with only 12 per cent in actual opposition. At this last count
before the measure was passed, 66 per bent of the knowledgeable group
approved the Plan.
Although approval of the Marshall Plan was never voiced by
more than a bare half of the population, approval ran as high as
66 per cent among the group who had heard of it prior to the time
when they were questioned aboittheir attitudes. That knowledge of
the plan was but one factor in securing approval is indicated in the
fact that approval within. this knowledgeable group also increased
over the eleven-month period between the Harvard speech and the
passage of the bill.
194. Ibid., NOrC, Janinrv 1, 1948.
195. Ibid., Fortune, Jantiar 1, 1 9 4 8
196. AIPO, February 1948.
197. NORC, March 1948.
Other reasons for support of the measure are shown in several
polls taken over the eleven months. The initial reaction to the
new concept of foreign aid was that we should help everyone who
needed it whether or not they were unfriendly to us, (53 per cent
198
to 41 per cent). This humanitarian motivation largely predominated
throughout the fall, and the first hint that the public would approve
of using the Marshall Plan as a weapon against communism came in
Decembei. At this time Gallup found as much as 11 per cent greater
approval for aid being used to improve conditions and to prevent
*199
European nations "from going Communistic--rather than merely
lending them the money "to be spent for goods bought in this country.
In February, humanitarianism still predominated, however, as 56 per
of those familiar with the plan saw its purpose as that of helping
200
Europe--only 8 per cent feeling that it was to curb communism.
gut by the end of March, communint success in Czechoslovakia may
well havocaused 36 per cent to declare that the main purpose of the
aid was to prevent communism, in contrast to the 32 per cent who
still felt that the aid was to enable European countries to 'stand
on their own feet again." 201
198. Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XI, Fall 1947,p. 496, NORC, July, 1947.
199. Ibid., Vol. XII, Spring 1948, p. 173, AXPO, December 7, 1947.
200. bid., Vol. XI; Summer 1948, p. 366, AIPO, February 8, 1948.
201. NORC, March 1948.
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Apparently, the knowledge of the economic conditions that pre-
vailed in Europe was not a large factor in the growing approval for
the plan. Shortly after MarAjall gave his speech, 80 per cent of
those people questioned about the situation in Europe felt that
202
Europeans needed our help in order to get enough to eat. By
October, the great majority still felt that conditions were bad,
but there was some division .over the exact degree of seriousness.
Forty-three per cent termed the situation "extremely bad," 47 per cent felt
them to be "vonly fairly bad." A negligible 6 per cent were unaware
203
of any serious economic situation. It was interesting to note
that despite increasing support for the aid program, 59 per cent in
November (and 64 per cent in December) were convinced that Western
Europeans were not working hard enough for their own recovery. Only
about one fifth of the sample felt that they were doing their share.204
The character of the support given the arshall Plan by the
general public was as varied as that noted in the press and among
the various national organizations. Geographically, polls taken
just before passage of the measure found only a 12 per cent difference
202. Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XI, Fall 1947, p. 495. NORC,
July 1947.
203. NORCOctober 1947.
204. NORC, October, 1947.
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in the various sections of the country. New England and the Mid-
Atlantic states led the support, with the Central States lagging
205
slightly behind tho rest, Politically, the difference between the
major parties was even less noticable, since both Dewey and Roosevelt
supporters joined in supporting rehabilitation aid. A State Department
Study of the range of support among occupational groups found, not
unexpectedly, the highest support coming from professional people--
63.5 per cent approval. Among farmers and,. other proprietors it was
around 46 per cent; housewives, 35 per cent; and wage earners,
c. 30 per cent. The major differences came, as we have seen, in the
different educational levels. A Roper tabulation in February of
1948 obtained the following results:2 06
National College HS. Grade S.
Heard of Plan 85 98 91 68
generally favorable 39 61 40 21
generally against 14 17 14 12
undec ed 32 20 37 35
Have not heard 15 2 9 32
Two Con6lusions
1. Knowledgb of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan was the
most important factor in the degree of public support they received.
The polls taken on -the Marshall Plan are evidence. The character
of support for the new plans was diversified. Both humanitarian
205. Roper, February 16-23, 1948.
206. Ibid.
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and anti-Communist motivations were present. The consistency with
which approval was greater among the more "aware" and the better
educated groups suggests that the degree of support which can be
mobilized for a foreign policy measure will largely depend upon
the extent to which the public can be informed.
2. The success of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan can
be directly attributed to the oleadership exercised by the Administration.
The mobilization of public opinion behind these new foreign
policy concepts was a major feat. Against terrific political odds,
what appeared inevitably to be essentially unpopular measures received
the unqu allfied backing of top government leadership. That government
leaders were unstinting in their efforts to put across these new
plans is the key to their success. The President', the Secretary of
State, and Under Secretary Acheson all spoke out clearly in favor
of these programs; the State Department worked indefatigably to
inform both Congress and the leaders throughout the country.
Senator Vandenberg was able to guide legislation through Congess
with the knowledge not only that government leadership supported
the bill fully but also that the Administration was working to mobilize
the opinion of the country. While Congress itself was never opposed
to the principles of the plan, there was a great deal of controversy
oVer- the methods to be used; and it was the patient work of Senator
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Vandenberg, coupled with the often expressed Congressional sentiment
that "there was no alternative" that brought about the passage of
the European Recovery Program. Nevertheless, the acceptance of
revolutionary foreign tipolicy principles by a majority was a direct
result of the direct appeal of the executive branch to the common
sense of the American people.
VI
ASIA: TRUMAN AND MCARTHUR
The postwar situation in Asia, where the nbwly independent
nations were caught up in the tasks of organizing stable governments
while simultaneously ittempting to control the explosive forces of
nationalism and suppress communist efforts to take over power
whenever local conditions could be exploited, was as threatening
to long-range American interests as was the situation in Europe.
But there was no comparaAX effort on the part of the Administration
to formulate an American policy in Asia, and no act of Presidential
leadership an attempt to inform and enlist the support of American
public opinion behind a constructive approach to the Asian problem.
While the Asian situation deteriorated steadily, there were
apparently only confusion and bitter disagreements in American minds
as to what the nation should do. It was not until Communist North
Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel in June 1950 that the
challenge in Asia inspired a direct and unequivocal American response.
At the start of the Korean War, the issue seemed well defined and
restricted, the American task clear.
But the entrance of Chinese Communist forces into the war raised
questions and doubts in American minds. Where and how was the war
to end; indeed, how was it to be fought? Could the supply bases of
the Northern troops outside Korea be attacked? Would it be enough
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to drive the invaders back to the 39th parallel? Would North
Korea have to be occupied? How could the flow of Chinese troops
to the aid of the North Koreans be stemm9 These were a few of
the questions that a perplexed public a ed as the UN forces sulfered
severe setbacks in the winter of 195 951.
Oplfiin Situation
In the last month of 1950 the press was primarily concerned
with the intervention of the Chinese troops into the war, and commentators
of both press and radio disagrood sharply. on the course to be
followed, The majority were firmly against extending the war
further into Asia, and the possibility of complete withdrawal was
debated, By the end of January, although questioning about the,
purpose of the fighting continued, the improvement in the military
situation was reflected in the more restrained and optimistic comment
on the whole Korean issue. When mounting evidence that a war of
attrition was likely the'doasreincreased for a peace settlement,
many commentators suggested the 38th parallel as the dividing line.
In September of 1950, when the military situation was favorable
to the UN forces, 81 per cent of an NORC poll thought that the
United States had been right to send troops to stop the C.o:unist
207invasion of the South.. But by January of 1951, the percentage in
207. NORC, September 1950.
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approval had dropped to a low of 55 per cen??8 climbing back only
five points by March A Gallup poll in January which asked
whether United States troops should stay on in Korea found 66
per cent in favor of wit'hdrawal of our forces "as fast as possible,
with only 25 per cent in favor of remaining In the next month,
when the situation had improved, the figures were reversed. Sixty-
seven per cent agreed that we should stay on. 211 Over half the population
was now confident that we would be able to fight indefinitely.2 1 2
In September, when asked about the general policy to be followed
in the conduct of the war, more than half of the people polled
wanted not only to drive the Communists out of South Korea but also
213
to go on to try and occupy North Korea as wel. In February
they were almost evenly divided on whether the UN should try to
work with the Chinese Communists to settle the war or refuse to compromise
.Ith them and simply "take stronger measures against them," although
Gallup found large popular sentiment in favor of a truce at the
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39th parallel if the Chinese agreed to stop fighting at that point.
208. NORC January 1951.
209.NORC, March 1951.
210. AIPO January 1951.
211. NORC, February 1951.
212. Ibid.
213. NORC September 1950.
214. AIPO, February 1951
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According to poll figures, dissatisfaction with the manner in which
the United Nations was handling the situation was felt by 50
215
per cent of Americans in the first two months of .1951, probably
because of the military reversals and the slowness of the U.N.
in labeling nfed. China an aggressor; but there was. no indication
216
of any desire to withdraw from the organization.
THE DISMISSAL
The dismissal of General MacArthur had an explosive effect
upon the American people when it was announced on April 11, 1951.
It came at a time when dissatisfaction and confusion about our
Korean policy--as well as our whole Far Eastern policy--was rife,
and it was to serve as a focus for nationwide discontent. The
Korean War had not been a popular crusade. The number of citizens
who could have located Korea on a map prior to June of 1950 must
have been infinitesimal. The number who could now have defined
in a few well chosen words the exact nature of the war and the objectives
the United States government had in mind was probably not much larger.
Even in the nation's top command there was no precise answer> to
be found. Indeed, a press conference hold by General Van Fleet later
in April, after the MacArthur dismissal, revealed a certain fogginess
in the mind of the 8th, Army commander himself:
215. NORC, January 30, 1951, NORC, February 1951.
216. NORC, February 1951.
At Van Fleet's first press conference on April 22,
1951, he was asked by a correspondent: 'General, what
is our goal?' 'I don't know,' Van Fleet said. 'The answer
must come from higher authority.' 'How may we know,
General, when and if we achieve victory?' 'I don't
know,' Van Fleet replied, 'except that somebody higher
up will have to tell us.' 2 1 7
To maiy Americans, Genera. MacArthur, with his frank, forth-
right statements, his record during the Second World War, and his
success in Japan, stood as the only tangible factor in the whole
murky Korean situation.. That the General was perhaps responsible
for the military reverses that had shocked the nation a few months
previously was apparently forgotten. His idiosyncracies--the corn
cob pipe and the casual dress--were famous. His aloofness enhanced
his reputation as something of a seer on Far Eastern matterr. The
technical constitutional issues involved carried little weight against
the tremendous surge of popular feeling for him that the President's
announcement had aroused. The overwhelming emotional support for
MacArthur was certainly a reflection f the bewilderment that prevailed
about Korea. The auotere and comman ing figure of MacArthur, with
his blunt program of maximum force Boomed at the moment to offer
the way to the only goal that th American people could comprehend--
unconditional surrender.
217. Melvin B. Voorhees, Korean Tales (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1952), p.61.
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PUBLIC REACTION
It is significant that in the nationwide debate which followed
upon the President's decision, it was the so-called public opinion
leaders--tho Administration, the great majority of editors, and the
radio commentators--who stood in opposition to the public consensus.
Although an extremely vocal section of the press was vigorous in its
support of the General, it was a minority. (This does not mean that
the majority was uncritical of the Admini'tration. It was, on the
contrary, loud in its demand that the President clearly define the
aims of the United States in Korea.) But this support for the
correctness of the President 's action was not enough to halt the
tremendous volume of vitriol.c telegrams and letters that poured
into the White House and flooded Congressional offices.
This mail was sent by the 58 per cent of the population which
immediately opposed the dismissal. Only 28 per cent favored the
218
President's action. In May and July this high percentage of
protest dropped some 10 points but shortly climbedr again to: rogister
219
around 60 per cent in favor of the General. The difference in
groups by education was only about 4 to 8 per cent. Among political
218. NORC, April 1951.
219. NORC, May, July., August, October, and November 1951.
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groups, President Truman had the backing of only 36 per cent of his
own party, with 53 per cent in opposition. Among Republicans a scant
17 per cent approved o! what he had done, while 72 per cent were
opposed. Independent voters tended to adhere more closely to the
divisions in the Democratic party. 2 0
Of interest are the reasons given in a late April poll by the
NORC. Those who felt that the President had been correct spoke
chiefly of MacArthur as having failed to obey orders and having
gone "outside his military job." About one-sixth thought that his
policies "might have brought us into war with the Soviet Union."
Those who disapproved of what the President had done replied as
follows: 221
1. MacArthur understood the situation better; was
on the spot and knows Far East better:
2. MacArthur is a good, experienced general; great
man; best general we ever had:
3. MacArthur's policies are best; he could have
ended war; should 'have been given free hand;
was right about bombing Communists:
4. MacArthur is too great to be fired; didn't
deserve a disgrace; should have been done quietly;
deserved a hearing, a chance to explain:
220.
221.
19
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22
NORC April 1951.
NORC, April 1951 (the percentage total exceeds 100 per cent
because interviewees gave more than one answer).
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5. Miscellaneous--Asiatic people like him; bad time
time to change Generals; Truman was playing
politics, hasn't proved his case: 25%
Millions turned out to greet MacArthur as he made his way
across the country on his return; and when on April 19th he made
his address before a joint meeting of Congress, he commanded the
largest television and radio audience the nation had yet known.
The response to his speech was no less tremendous. In Congress,
where the reaction was on partisan lines, one Representative was
V222
moved to declare: "We heard God speak here today,2
Press comment was more restrained, although there was no attempt
to minimize the forcefulness and drama of the occasion. While most
felt that the issue was whether MacArthur's proposals would bring
war with Russia or not, there was sharp controversy about the answer.
Many agreed with James iteston when he said:
Big questions raised by General MacArthur's speech
are not whether we want what General MacArthur wants but
whether we -are prepared to risk what he is prepared to risk
and whether we are prepared to risk it alone. Almost
everybody wants advantage of total victory over Chinese
Communists without disadVantagen of total war, but is
this possible or even nrobable? 22 3
222, Richard H. Rovere and, Arthur Ma ohleiAnger Jr., The General
and the President, New York: Farrar, Strauss and Young, 1951, p. 15,
223. James Reston, New York Times, April 22, 1951.
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The tendency of may editors and commentators, especially on the
East Coast, was to back the attempt by the Administration to limit
the war.
The GenerAl"s speecb was only the beginning of the debate
with the Administration, but popular interest did not sustain its
high pitch much past MacArthur's testimuy*, which opened the Senate
hearing on May third. The hearings themselves, while begun as an
inquiry into the dismissal of the General, ranged broadly over the
whole of the Far Eastern situation and America's global strategy.
Articulate comment during this period generally agreed that the
controversy had been of some value in clarifying our policy, and
went on to criticise the Administration for the absense of leader-
ship. The perspective brought by the testimony of the Secretary
of State and the Joint Chiefs gave support to the general press
view that the Administration had been correct in acting as it had;
but the opposition remained unconvinced, arguing that MacArthur 's
firmer- policies were actually being adopted, thus vindicating him.
There was little doubt, however, that both interest in the matter
and the General's influence had waned considerably. As the hearings
were drawing to a close at the end of June, press attention shifted
to expectation (of a cease fire agreement and away from the heated
partisanship to which the dismissal had given rise.
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EFFECT OF DISMISSAL ON FOREIGN POLICY OPINION
Although the emotional atmosphere that pervaded the country
stbsided in the course of the hearings as public interest dropped
sharply, it is interesting to study what effect, if any., MacArthur
and his views had on the thinking of the American people about
our foreign policy.
Prior to the dismissal, there were some 60 per cent who felt
that the United States had been right to send its troops to Korea
224
to halt the invasion of the Northern forces. This percentage
remained constant until November of 1951, when it dropped to 54
225
per cent--possibly because of discouragement over the truce talks.
In analysing an April poll, it can be seen that the supporters of
the President were somewhat more in favor of having sent troops
226
than were MacArthur's followers (75 per cent and 60 per cent).
On the question of whether to .try to work out a cease fire agreement
or continue fighting, the division that existed prior to the dismissal
continued on into the. end of April, with the General's adherents only
a21. -NORC, March 1951.
225. NORC, November 1951.
226. NORC, April 1951.
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slightly more in favor of continuing the war. By the end of the
year there was definite support for a continuktion i:of the talks;
even 61 per cent of MacArthur 's supporters favored them, 2 2aithough
229
only three out of ten people had hopes of a satisfactory agreement.
As to our general policy in Korea, a late lipril poll found
23068 per cent in favor of keeping our troops the'e--only a one ,point
difference from the February tabulatinn. The percentage rose to
73 per cent in May. 2 5A breakdown of the earl..er April poll reveals
that 69 per cent of MacArthur's supporters and 77 per cent of those
who had favored his dismissal were in favor (if keeping troops in
Korea. A July Gallup poll did find a 54 per cent to 35 per cent
count advocating withdrawing UN troops 'if the Communists agreed
to withdraw theirs; 2 t this was by no means a defeatist attitude,
as indicated in two polls at the close of the year after many months
233
of peace talks.
227. NORC, April 1951.
228.. NORC, October 1951.
229. NORC, November 1951.
230. NORC, April 1951.
231. NORC, May 1951.
232. AIPO, July 1951.
233. NORC, November 1951, December 1951.
Which one of these three t ngs comes closest to Late
your idea of what we shou do in Korea? Nov. Dec.
1. Pull our troops out of Korea and bring
them home. 17% 16%
2. Attack the Communist forces now with
everything we have. 43 43
3. Continue the war on the present basis
while the peace talks are going on. 35 36
Those who chose number 2 in November were fairly evenly divided
on whether Russia would enter the war.
Two specific policies that General MacArthur advocated--bomb"
ing the Chinese supply bases in Manchuria, and freeing the troops
of Chiang Kai-Shek for active duty--were also the subject of several
polls. Four times a sample polling section was queried on -:ther
United States airplanes should be allowed to cross the Manchurian
border and bomb Communist supply m.bases inside China, with the
234.
following resuts .
April Agst October
Should bomb 56 55 54 60
Should not 26 30 31 23
Here is an analysis of responses in April and October. between those
who supported MacArthur and those who believed that the President
had been right in dismissing him:
234 NORC, April 1951, May 1951, August 1951, October 1951.
235 NORC, 'April 1951, October 1951.
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Dismissal Right Dismissal Wrong
April October April October
Should bomb 39 52 68 7 68
Should not 44 y 35 19 > 18
Apparently there was a definite shift in opinion toward a more
vigorous policy later in the year among that group which *pupported
President Truman's decision, while the views of the .General's
friends remained unchanged.
April and May surveys on whether to give the Chinese Nationalist
government all the help it needed to attack the Communists on the
.236
mainland indicated- that 58 per cent and 56 per cent would approve
such a step. In a breakdown of the late April poll, those who had
approved MacArthur's dismissal were only slightly opposed to aiding
the Nationalists (45 per cent to 41 per cent). Those who had opposed
the dismissal were far more strongly in favor of the aid policy
(71 per cent to 16 per cent). In late April, 65 per cent were anxious
237for the United States to stay out of an all-out war with the Chinese.
At this time borbing the Manchurian bases and aiding Chiang Kai-Shek
were not considered risky. However, it is interesting to see that
a guestion asked in the. next month as to whether those two policies
236. NORC, April 1951 May 1951.
237. NORC, April 1951.
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would be more likely to end the war or start an even larger war showed:
End fighting 35 ,
Even worse war 47
n. 0. 18
Evidently the apprcximately 55 per cent in May who approved the
bombing and help for the Nationalists consisted of the 35 f per cent
who hoped those policies would end the war plus about 20 per cent
who were frantly in favor of an all-out war.
As the MacArthur hearings progressed, the questioning and the
discussion in the nation shifted from the Korean war itself to larger
policy questions, wuch as relations with our Allies, whether or not
we were prepared to risk a big war, the relative importance attached
to Europe and Asia, and the general handling of our foreign affairs.
All were questions which General MacArthur had directly or indirectly
raised, and ali were subjects of polling interviews in the year of.
his disri,-ral.
A majec' of the respondents questioned (54 per cent) were
dissatisiied with the way zngland, France, and our other Allies
are cooperating with us in the struggle against world comnmnism."
238. NCRC, May 1951.
239. NOIC, May 1951.
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The most frequently mentioned complaints were that they had not
supplied enough troops and that they traded with Communist countries.
We have already noted a late April poll which revealed a strong
majority of 65 per cent who felt that we 8 ould try hard to avoid
the risk of war with Communist China. The reason for this wish
was apparent in the fact . that 71 per cent indicated that in a
240
war with China we wotild also find ourselves fighting Russia.
On the more general matter of our foreign policy towards Europe
and Asia, April polls found MacArthur supporters not very far from
241
the position of the opposition.
Pro MacArth r Pro Truman
Approve troops to Europe 56 65
* Xaeconomic aid to 70 70
For Arms aid to Asia 61 59
A similar question asked over a riod of a year reveals the slightly
increased importance of Asia in rican thinking, although not
at the expense of Europe. Two years later, however, Europe had
24U
regained much of its importance in the public's mind.
240 NORC April 1951.
241, NORC, April 1951.
242. NORC, April 1950, July 1950, November 1950, April 1951,
-
April 14 1953.
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In general, which do you -,think is more important
for the U.S. to do--to keep the Communists from
taking over Asia, or to keep the Communists from
taking over Europe?
(Similar question on all surveys)
Asia Europe Both Neither N'.0.
April 1950 9 48 25 4 14
July 17 51. 18 1 13
November 21 49 16 2 13
April 1951 16 32 35 2 15
May 14, 1953 15 43 30 2 10
While the above attitudes reflect American policy at the time, and
although both groups were in favor of Secretary Acheson continuing
243
in office in the .autumn of 1951 (granting that MacArthur's supporters
were far less enthusiastic), popular favor for the "handling of our
foreign affairs" was down to 28 per cent in April and 34 per cent
244
the next month. Bly October, those in approval had increased some-
245
what, but there was a marked difference between the two groups:
For Dismissal Against Dismissal
Approve handling 55 28
Disapprove 36 60
SOME CONCLUSIONS
Once the MacArthur controversy died down, it became difficult
to recall how vital it had seemed at the time, for its effect
2431. NORC, October 1951.
2 a44. NORC, April 1951, May 1951.
. NORr', October 1951.-
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on the nation was not easy to discern. However, two conclusions
can be drawn from our study of this period:
1. The actual dismissal of General MacArthur assumed only a
temporary importance.
The most immediate consequence was certainly the immense
tide of popular sentiment running against President Truman. The
President never had a majority of citizens in agreement with him on
the rightness of his action in dismissing the General. His supporters
initially included some 28 per cent of the population, and only
once, in July, were they as many as 39 per cent. By November only
246
27 per cent felt that he had been correct in what he had done. A
second indication of public Jisapproval, as distinct from the comment
in the press and on the rado, was the very low esteem in which
his handling of our foreign affairs was held. But by the end of
the year, this disapproval -had somewhat abated.
More surprising however, was the relatively minor effect the
General had on the attitudes of Americans toward foreign Solicy.
There was little if any change of popular opinion on the dispatch
of U.S. troops to Korea in the preceding year, on keeping our troops
there, the desirability of a cease fire, and avoiding a major war.
While the importance of Asia in the American mind did increase
246. NORC, April 1951, May 1951, July 1951, August 1951, October
1951, November 1951.
114
there was no inclination to underrate the importance of Europe.
The one important effect that MacArthur's views did have was to
cause Americans to ,advocate a more militant policy in Asia--
to the extent of bombing the Manchurian bases and using. the Nationalist
troops against the Comiminists. It is very likely that this was
an expression of the deep frustration felt by almost all Americans
over the -inconclusiveness of the fighting.
The long-range consequences of the Truman-MacArthur debate
were not apparent until the hearings drew to a close. Most observers
were then able to agree that the controversy had served to clear
the air and make the publ1c somewhat more aware of the delicate
situation in which the United States found itself in the Far East.
The government spokesmen had presented their case well; and, although
the most violent opponents were not appeased, the testimonies of
administration leaders had a moderating influence. Despite the
emotional jag" that ;had beer touched off when the General returned
to the United States--and the vast irritation of American with the
cautious policies of the Administration--by the end of the year$signs
'of patience were evident. Frustrating truce talks had gone on for
six months. Three to one majorities felt that neither Russia nor
247
Red China wanted the Korean war to end.
247 AIPO October 1951.
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Yet there wai no sizable demand for cessation of the talhs.
2. TI'e real significance of the Truman-MacArthur controversy
was that It reflected a divided American opinion on the nation's
entire Fv.r Eastern policy--which,:.in turn, reflected a lack of
national leadership.
"ruman and the Administration emerged apparent victims, but
it 'ias clear that the dispute had arisen in the first place from
indecisive leadership. MacArthur offered a quick, conventional
military victory, or so it appeared. The President asked for
patience and could not promise success. MacArthur spoke of the
well-trained Nationalist troops th. voro e :: to fight the Communists.
PresiCent Truman could not explain frar.:ly why this ready supply
of men could not be used. Moreover, h: *and to ask the American
people to be prepared to live in a state of crisis, and to accept
the fact that sometimes there-were more important considerations
than a military victory.
The intelligent use of the -hearings by the Administration
was only a partial solution, for the questions that the Amorican
people were asking in the winter of 1950-1951 went largoly unanswered.
No solution to the problem of the Chinese troops and how to end the war
was ever clearly outlined by the Administration, -which failed to
offer a clear, alternate program to the General's proposal for
maximum force.
4 ,
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The problem became one of communication-of the Administration's
policies to the people. Congress in this instance did not have
an 'ndependent role, for the issue, unlike the others that we have
studied, involved no legislation. Reasoned arguments in the press
were not enough to stem the highly emotional response to the figure
of a great General. The failure of the Administration to identify
itself with the- policies that it did practice and to enlist public
support behind the figure of the chief executive is nowhere more
evident than in the polls which showed the American people in favor
of most of its foreign policies--yet supposedly strongly opposed
to the way in which our foreign affairs were handled. This paradox
continued well after MacArthur had passed from the center of attention.
VII
FOREIGN AID: 1947-1956
Grain to India
After the main principles underlying extensive foreign,
economic aid had been approved by the American public at the time
of the Marshall Plan in 1947-1948, public opinion did not concern
itself very seriously with the matter for several years. The Koreau
War seemed to make military aid to those nations who had chosen
to ally themselves with us logical as well as eminently desirable.
However, in the spring of 1951 the question of economic aid actively
engaged popular interest a second time,. In December of 1950, Mme.
Pandit, India's ambassador to the United Nations, had asked the
United States government for two million tons of grain on "special
and easy" terms to avert an impending famine in the coming summer.
Mime. Pandit's request came at an apparently favorable time
in terms of prevailing American attitudes toward aid. Several polls
taken over a one-year period, from March of 1949 through April.
of 1950, found between 70 per cent and 75 per cent of the respondents
agreeing on principle that "it is a good pol.Lcy for the United States
to try and help backward countries in the world to raise their
,n248
standard of living. -When that same question was asked again in
November of 1950 after the begining of the Korean war, scepticism
117
248. NORC, March 1949, November 1949, April 1950.
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about the value of such aid was reflected in the percentage drop
249
from the 73 per cent of April to a 62 per cent in November; but
those in favor of aid were still a definite majority. Asked
directly about whether aid in raising the standard of living of
Asian countries wiould make them "less likely to go Communist," those
who agreed, 60 per cent, were comparable in numbers to those who
had considered aid a good idea generally.
When queried more specifically about sending aid to "friendly
countries in Asia," docided majorities of 62 per cent (right after
the Korean invasion) and 71 per cent in the spring of 1951 were
251
ready to back help to friedds. Even larger percentages later
in 1951--77 per cent in July, and 75 per cent in October--were
willing to send economic aid "to countries that have agreed to stand
,252
with us against Communist agression.
Although this scattering of polls makes it difficult to generalise
about attitudes toward aid:it is possible to see that a majority
was agreed upon the value of foreign aid even though the Korean war
had proved that recipients would not necessarily turn out to be
249. IORC, April ,950, November 1950.
250. NORC, October 1950.
251. NORC, July 1950, April 1951.
252. NORC, July 1951, October 1951.
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military allies. There was, naturally, an even greater enthusiasm
for supporting those nations with whom we were allied militarily;
but no sharp distinction was made between "friends" and those
nations which had chosed to remain neutral in the Korean struggle
until the time of the proposed bill to provide grain for India
in response to Mme, Pandit's request.
A year prior to Mme. Pandit's request, relations between the
United Statcs and Ind±a were of the most cordial, and optimism and
general good-will had marked Nerhu's visit to the United States in 1940.,
A little more than a year later, in the early months of 1951 1 the
situation had noticably deteriorated. When, in 1949, Nchiru had made
some disturbing statements about the neutral role India hoped to
play in world politics, their significance had -not been fully appreciated;
but in 1950, when a neutral India had declined to take an active
military part in the United Nation's action in Korea, Nehru"s words
had taken on a new meaning.
India's refusal to send troops to join the United Nations'
forces in Korea aroused American hostility, which was increased by
India's recognition of the Chinese Communist government and her
proposal that this government be given the Nationalist's seat on
the Security Council.
. 9
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There were Americans who felt that we should not have intervened
in Korea, but, since the step had been taken and the United Nations
had officially joined us, the American public could not understand
why a leading noncommunist member of the UN would not back the
intervention fully. The defeats suffered by the UN forces in the
winter of 1950 did not help American attitudes toward India.
India's stock had subsequently fallen still lower due to the
Indian attitude on the 'Japanese peace treaty. The outright dismay
felt by many at the course Nehru had chosen to follow now frequently
found expression into sharp criticism. Unlike China and Israel,
India had no strong bloc of American political support, and Nohru's
often incomprehensible acts found few defendents.
It was, therefore, in an atmoshore of considerable American
ill-will that the President sent a special message to Congress in
February asking for a gift of grain to be sent to India. It took
over five months of congressional debate and delay befcre even
a loan was granted. The final passage of the measure by the Senate
in June marked a victory 'for the many private citizenscharitable
organizations, and much of the nation's press who worked long months
for the passage of the bill to bring, relief to a starving peoplo.
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The appeal to humanitarian instincts was strong. It would seem
that no one could possibly argue that it would be wrong for us
to give food grains to people on the verge of starvation. But
objections sprung up from all sides.
The chief reason for hesitation 5 a of course political. Since
Nehru had not chosen to align India th the West, the limited
but highly vocal group -that opposecy the Indian leader in Congress
felt that the grain should be us as a bargaining instrument to
secure India's allegiance, While only a very small group actually
would not have allowed a grant, there were many who were opposed to
simply *.giving the grain away--which, indeed, India had not rcquested.
Sone of these opponents expressed concern over the depletion of
U.S. resources; and there was support for exchanging the grain for
strategically important materials that India possessed..
In the course of the five months, hundreds of reasons were
unearthed as to why the. grain should not be sent.. Was India's need
as great as she made it out to be? Was the shortage really due to
natural causes or to poor' planning? Couldn't relief be gotten
easily from adjacent Pakistan, or did India seek food elsewhere for
political reasons? Should the new lands India had just planted
with Jute have been used for wheat instead--or was planting jute
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a part of her trade war with Pakistan? The Chicago Tribune's
scept-cal attitude was typical of such thinking. In their one
editorial on the grain issue entitled "How Real Is India's Famine?",
they declared:
Our feeling about the loan..,is that we want to
be Ihonn. We don't mind the money involved.., because
the treasury gives away billions and just might as well
give it to the indians as to other foreigners. Certainly
we do not begrudge the wheat Io starving people. But
what we don't like is being played for suckers and
253
we'd like to be sure in this case...
Behind the questions lay a deep resentment of India's neutrality 4
Americans were being killed in Korea to uphold the United Nation's
concept of collective security, to protect Asia from the advance
of Communism. Meanwhile, at the United Nations Headquarters in
New York India sought to prev'ent the UN -from branding Communist
China an aggressor.
The opponents of the grain bill were only a small segment of
national opinion whose influence was important chiefly in Congress.
Support for and interest in the measure elsewhere was widespread.
With few exceptions, commentators voiced solid support. Church,
labor, and political groups, as well as private citizens from all
over the country showed remarkable interest. Instances were noted
253. Chicago Tribune, February 19, 1951.
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of private individuals sending in bags of grain to the Indian Consulate
in New York. "Letters to the Editors" columns frequently contained
references to the matter as the United States displayed wide conce~f
for the Indian people for the first time. The volume of comment
in the press was confined chiefly to instances such as when former
President Hoover and President Truman publicly endorsed the moasure-
but articulate opinion was so strongly in favor of the bill at these
times that there was no reason to think that lack of coverage
(now concentrated on the MacArthur debate) meant a change of heart.
The New York Times was perhaps the leader in what became
virtually a nationwide campaign to pass the bill. The coverage of
the Times itself took on something of the nature of a crusade,
with 20 editorials all strongly urging passage. The character of
this support is bast seen in the first of these editorials.
If there has been some hesitation in extending
help in some quarters in this country because India's
stand on Chinese communist aggression seems something
les3 than valorous, such hesitation should be clearly
stamped as unworthy. We may not agree'with the
political analysis of some of India's leaders, but
that has nothing to do with the fact that millions
of helpless persons look to us for a chance of
survival. We may think that Prime Minister Nehru
may be mistaken in his appraisal of Peiping, but there
can be no mistake.about the reality of hunger.
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By the same token the argument that perhaps we
should 'combat comnunism' is as tawdry as it is thread-
bare... hunger doesn 2 t create commuinism. It is
not the reason why our help should be given. That
ground lies in the moral obligation laid upon us
by our plenty.
Tha omphasis wvs pri;:nrily on humanitarianism, but the value ol
counteracting Russiaa and Chinese offers was not overlooked,, There
was a minimum of discussion of the means by which the grain should
be sent, although con mont was generally in: favor of a gift, with
no "stringo ." Enthuiansm for Nehru "s foreign policy was certainly
minimal; but there was strong feeling that the grain should be sent
as a humanitarian gesture of one people toward another and that
political considerations should not be involved. The compromise
Measure that was eventually adopted was accepted as "better than
nothing."
Unfortunately, Congress was none too responsive to the idea of
its "moral obligation despite the clamor from citizens groups,
the impatience of the press, and the endor ement of two such di verso
public figures an Hoover and Trumen, As a direct consequence of
Nehru's pr->test at brending Red China he aggressor in Korea,
254 , New York Timcs, January 22, , pa. .6.
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Senatoy Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committtee, sidetracked the request by referring it to the Subcommittee
on Near Eastern Affairs while the whole question of United States
relations with India was considered. When the bill did finally
move onto the floor of Congress, the battle was sharp, despite
the backing of Senator zs Taft and Knowland and the bipartisan con
mittee of 24 Congressmen formed to push the measure through. The
intransigentcy of the House Rules Committee made a compromise bill
of half loan-half grant necessary to end a .6 week deadlock, but
House action was immediately postponed when Nehru publicly .objected
to the strings that had been attached to the Congressional bill.
Not until the middle of June was there finally agreement between
the House and the Senate on a loan-not a gift-ending five months
of debate.
Recorded public opinion on the matter showed a majority izd
favor of giving, rather than -loaning, food--even when the wording
of the pollster's question contained reference to India's opposition
to our Korean policy. Fifty-five per cent favored the gift, a
percentage that went. as high as 68 per cent among the college
educated groups; 37 per cent disapproved0 However, of the 37 per
cent opposed to a gift, 26 per cent would send food if India were
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to give something in return. Another April poll, this time
by Gallup, in which India's position on Korea was not mentioned
2 56
found a comparable 59 per cent favoring the gift. The polls would
seem to indicate that political considerations were not a factor in
the backing that the bill received from the public.
.Although the grain bill did not ,receive the most vigorous
backing of the chief executive-who was certainly kept busy with
the MacArthur affair--thore was no doubt where his sentiments lay.
The press and many public groups, as well as numerous individual
citizens, shewed great unanimity of support. Despite the bitterness
engendered by the Korean war and the hostility of a vocal group
withint Congress, the general public also favored the grain bill.
There was no love for India among a large' percentage of Americans-
and even less understanding; yet a mjority would have approved
a gift of the grain, or at least a Joan, over a mOnth before Congress
acted favorably. Plainly, it was the emotional appeal--that of
a starving people--which won the support of so many Americans. The
delay in legislative action was due less to inadequate leadership
than to the legislative process which permitted a small group of
255 . NORC, April 1951.
256. AIPO, April 25, 1951.
a 
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men motivated by political considerations to hold-up the measure
at will. One might conclude that the passage of the bill due to
the strong measure of support that it received from the leading
opinion forrmulators throughout the country and to the pressure they
exerted upon congrossmen.
Interval 1951-1956
For the noxt five years, although each year the dobnte over
the appropriation for foreign aid caused a flurry of interest, and
it was an issue of certain importance in the elections, thero was
neither any radically new program nor any crisis such as that of
a starving India to rouse the interest of Americans. The grndual
shift in the character of foreign aid from economic to preponderantly
military emphasis, and a slower- shift away from Europe to Asia,
took place w-'th relatively little public notice. Not until early
in 1956 was foreign aid again the subject of a nationwide controversy
when the concepts underlying foreign aid and the current handling
of the program were called into question by many national figures.
In the years betwecn the India grain debate and the 1956 dispute,
opinion on most apectn of foreigo aid remainod relatively constaqnt.
Foreign aid ref,,ilarly recieved the approval of a majority. Even when
an April 1954 question specified the amount of the President*s
proposal for foreign aid appropriations--and mention of figures
% a
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generally brings approval percentages shown--some 56 per cent found
his proposal "about the right amount," with 8 per cent finding it
inadequate. The total, therefore, in favor of at least the amount
mentioned was 64 per cent . Only oae in four found the figure too
large Meanwhile, thi approval for help for "ackward Countries,
which4 h:3rd dicopped to '#2 per nt in the dark hours of the Korean
258
war, rose to a7 new h h of 7C per cent early in the spring of 1955
In general, do you think it is a good policy
for the United States to ty to help backward countries
in the world to raise their standard of living, or
shouldn't it be any concern of our government? 259
U.S. should help No concern N O0
March 1949 72 23 5
November 1949 75 20 5
April 1950 73 22 .5
November 1950 62 31 7
February 1952 69 27 4
September 1952 73 23 4
March 1955 79 18 3
One aspect of the United States' foreign aid efforts which
met with particular approval was the technical assistance program.
In May 1955 almost 2 out of 3 Americans claimed to have heard of
257. VORC, April 1954.
258. NORC, March 1955.
259. NORC,
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the program when it was briefly described to them. A breakdown
of groups by educational. levels found 86 per cent of the college-
educated group claiming knowledge, and 49 per cent of those who
had attended only grammar school- almost ha If-declared that they
were farmiliar with the plan of sending experts to -backward nations
2GO
to Ielp them with ngriculturrl anA heoalth problems, That support
for the program did not entirely hinge upon prior knowledge can
be seen in the fact thatwhereas 64 per cent of the national sample
had heard of the program previously, 79 per cent, after a brief
explanntion, frvored it. Support was considerably higher, however,
among the group who had been informed before the interview (90 per
261
cent) than among those who had not heard of it before.
A more siUnificait cluo to the ready support that such a pro:-gram
commanded was proviLdcd in the willingness of the pIblic to spend
money to see that it was carried out,, Once it was discovered
(see Chartt, p 129) that 75 POr cent and 79 per cent in 1949 and
1955 were willJing to help und'erdcveloped nations raise their living
standards, the following question was asked:
260, NORC, Muy 1955.
261. NORC, May 1955
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This year the United States is spending about
$1.25 million (1949: $45 million) for this purpose,,
Does that revi to you too much, not enough, or
62
about the right amount to spend on it next year?
November 1949 March 1955
Not enough 7% 107 2139 5
Aout right 32J 42
Too rxuch 20 11
n o- 1.6 16
TCrA L 75 79
There was a 13 per cent increase in these years among the group
who felt that The figure--considerably larger in 1955--was either
adequate or not enough. At the onme time opposition to the figuren
oniJoned drooed A poll later in May of 1955 mentioning no specific
sum bi asrkin-, wJ-v t t a. od idea to rpend money f(;r e
263
technicJa. fodvi 7 per cen"i wil ling
From the time of the Marshal Plen the use of foi-eign aid
as a political weapon was openly acknowledged, but there were
many disputes us to the rel9tive efficacy of various types of aid
used for political puroses Two interesting polls, one in October
of 1950 which we have al)ready noted, and a second in September of
1954, asked whother Ui0 ted States help in aiding Asian countries
to raise their livirg s1tndards would make these countries much
I likely to go Comniirust, In 1950 those feelidg aid was an
effective weapon tot Xled Go p0i cent Fo
66 per cent in atroyal
;462, R vem!'r 9 'rch .5
263. NORC) Uiy 195
264, NOR Otober 1.95, September 1954.
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When questioned about military vO sus economic aid, there
was over a long period popular supp t for military aid for both
Europe and Asia. In November of 155 69 per cent voiced approval
265
of military supplies for WesternEurope. A series of polls
taken in 1950 and 1951 found from 51-61 per cent favoring sending
"military supplies to help those countries in Asia which are threatened
,,266
by communism. In the case of Asia, however, there was a gradual
shift in opinion away from military aid. Polls in September of
1954 and a year later in November of 1955 found 65 per cent and
74 per cent behind the proposition that to "keep communism from
spreading in Asia" it was "more important to send those countries
economic aid." Only 28 per cent, in each case, were opposed.2 6 7
To whom this aid should be sent was a further problem that
troubled administrators during these years. Should it be sent only
to proven friends, or should the neutral ,blocs also be recepients?
The polls of 1950 and 1951 found large majorities favoring aid to
friendly countries in Asia. In January of 1955 as many as 78 per
cent agreed to continue sending "economic aid--like machinery and
supplies--to countries that have agreed to stand with us against
265. IORC, November 1955.
266. Oal, figi 1 9 5 0 , October 1950, December 1950, January 1950,
267. NORC, September 10, 1954,. November 1955.
". 0 1
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Communist Aggression.1 268When it was asked whether we should continue
this economic aid to "countries like India, which have not joined
us as Allies against the Communists," the sample was much more
evenly divided. Only 47 per cent of the national sample wished
to continue such a policy; 41 per cent were opposed. The college
group were 76 per cent in favor and 27 per cent opposed; the grammar
school group were 46 per cent in favor and 37 per cent opposed. 269
It is apparent that between the grain loan and the 1956 debate
public opinion was not particularly interested in foreign aid,
despite the very real changes in the character of the program since
the Marshall Plan had been initiated. Although a majority of Americans
continued to approve the foreign aid program, they were not
critically concerned with what was an admittedly necessary but
costly policy. However, there was considerable awareness that aid
could be an effective political weapon; and, although military
aid had increasing approval, there were also increasing percentage3.
coming to feel that, in Asia anyway, economic aid was a more efficacious
means of winning allies. A discrepancy in this attitude can be noted
268. NORC, January 1955.
269. NORC, January 1955.
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in the close division of sentiment on sending aid to neutral nations.
If Americans felt that aid was an effective weapon--and 66 per
cent of them did--uhy then did they hesitate to send it to neutral
nations who presumably needed to be won to the West? This conflict
was perhaps one indication of a growing uncertainty. in ,the minds
of some about the exact role that foreign aid could and should play
in America's foreign policy.
Foreign Aid: 1956
At the close of 1955, as the annual aid bill was being prepared,
the first signs of a battle over foreign aid appeared. The Eisenhower
administration, pledged to reduce government spending, had managed
to cut down on its foreign aid appropriation requests in previous
years by making use of already appropriated frtds. Thus, although
the appropriation request had grown smaller each year, the actual
expenditure had not--a situation which gave a deceptive appearance
to foreign aid efforts and certainly created false hopes among those
concerned about government expenditures.
But by 1956, previously appropriated funds were nearly exhausted.
The President was in the uncomfortable position of having to almost
double the previous year 's request in an election year-and in the
face of the hostility of both a large section of Congress and many
members of his own party who had never fully accepted the concept of
foreign aid.
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That the problem should have arisen at this politically in-
auspicious moment was not due entirely to poor planning. The sense
of urgency that responsible government leaders felt, and which
caused them to try and force througi a measure unpopular with their
own party, was also a result of a new Soviet challenge in the field
of foreign aid. Hitherto the Soviet Union had confined its aid
endeavors to nations within the satellite bloc. Now it had begun,
in Asia and the Middle East as well as Yugoslavia, to offer aid on
terms that the United States could not always match.
Although initial Soviet e.orts were not nearly as extensive
as those of the United States, the natur of the Communist bloc
made it potentially a very formidable ival. Soviet state control
of industry gave Soviet aid offers f exibility that western democracies
could not hope to rival. Satellit nations with growing industries
could absorb raw materials from sia that the United States was unable
to use. The technicians sent by the Russians gave the communists
an excellent means to achieve ideological as well as economic
penetration.
President Eisenhower did not have to convince Congress of the
necessity for foreign aid. Few congressmen could be said to oppose
all aid. But there was opposition to the character of the program
proposed by the Administration--to its flexibility, the type of aid,
%, 4
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its purpose, the recipients. There was the issue of whether aid
should be given solely for political reasons or only for economically
sound programs. without the advantage of any bold new idea such as
the Marshall Plan advocates had put forward, and without any similar
crisis situation to inspire a novel approach, the Prdsident found
himself pushing anK outdated plan with a few new trappings at a
politically inauspicious time. The task was made even more difficult
by the reluctance of many of the President's party to support foreign
aid, much less a considerably larger appropriation than had been
expected, and at the same time commit themselves for several years
in advance, when the Republican Party stood committed to reducing
the Federal budget.
Congressional opposition was based upon many factors, the initial
one being irritation at the Administration for having given the
congressmen the impression, at a December 1955 White House meeting,
that the 1956 request would not exceed that of the previous year.
This inept handling of the situation did much damage, for congressional
leaders immediately put themselves behind the smaller figure on
the basis that support of a larger program would be difficult to
explain to the voters. Other political considerations were also
factors in the congressional reluctance to ;-.back the President.
Many Republicans had, in 1952, campaigned against foreign aid, and
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a shift might prove embarassing. The Democratic and Republican
leaders in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senators George
and Wiley, were having their own election problems in states whose
voter were by no means sold on the value.of(foreign aid. The
Democratic party itself had long advocated foreign aid, but now
support for those programs was no longer strong from the large
bloc of Southern Democrats who had grown more protectionist as
Northern industry moved into the South.2 7 0
Aside from political considerations, which were certainly not
favorable in the spring of 1956 for a greatly enlarged foreignA aid
program and any long-term commitment, the international situation
ostesibly did not lend itself to the President's arguments. There
seemed to be a lessening of tension in relations with the Soviet
Union. In Europe, our allies were cutting down on their defense
efforts. France 's strength was being drained in Africa. German
rearmament was proceeding slowly. Although there was much talk
about the new Soviet economic penetration into underdeveloped areas,
there was no agreement on the best method with which this threat
could be fought. Our aid programs seemed to have won us no friends
in Asia; and the rationale for defense spending and increased military
aid was more clear cut.
270. James Reston, New York Times, July 22, 1956.
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Objections to foreign aid had exi-sted, in one form or another,
ever since. the programs had been initiated. What was significant
about the 1956 Congressional debate was the number of traditionally
internationalist members who rebelled against the Administration's
leadership, The very men who had provided the backbone of support
in the last eight years for the aid appropriation were, at best,
reluctant to back the President's most recent request. These men
were discouraged about the efficacy of a program which put its
heaviest emphasis upon military aid, sending disproportionate sums
to. small nations such as Pakistan, Korea, and lNationalist China
and serving to distort their economies and antagonize their Asian
neighbors. Were a few friendly troops in Pakistan of value to the
West if Afganistan, India, and Burma were thereby alienated? More
arms to the Middle East and Asia did not seem to be making permanent
friends for the West--especially when a fairly small Soviet loan
often got more publicity than several years of large United States
gifts. Such criticism of the program by men who did not underestimate
the danger of the new Soviet efforts proved a formidable obstacle
to the Administration, which was left defending what appeared to be
the wrong program at the wrong time.-
Naturally, in such circumstances public discussion of foreign
aid was at a high level throughout the nation all during the spring
of 1956. A majority of commentators were strongly in support of
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both the continuation and the enlargement of the aid program, and
many were also for an economic emphasis as well as for the flexibility
which a long-term commitment would give to it. Even the Hearst
press joined the majority support given Secretary Dulles for his
Philadelphia address in February, in which he urged a more flexible
long-term economic aid program., Some agreed with former President
Truman's criticism that not enough aid had been requested. enry
Cabot Lodge, Jr. and Adlai Stevenson both came out for an increased
channeling of aid through the United Nations, a plan which in both
1952 and 1955 had had very few supporters among the general public.
Another aid advocate, Walter Reuther, wanted the United States to
set aside 2 per cent of its Gross National Product for the next
25 years to stimulate the economic growth of underdeveloped nations;
and Paul G. Hoffman asked for a $25 billion program spaced over
the next five years. Meanwhile commentators such as William H.
Chamberlain and David Lawrence urged a policy of selective aid.
Among the general public--where we have already seen a strong
backlog of approval for foreign aid--Gallup. found 57 per cent
approved for the appropriation of about $4 billion "for countries
in other parts of the world to help revent their going Communist"
when they were told that this amount was what congressional foreign
aid appropriations had averaged in "recent years." The difference
in response. between the two political parties was negligible, and
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opposition was declared by only one in four. This poll, however,
cannot be considered a wholly accurate indication of opinion, for
the working of the question was such that a favorable reply should
not have been difficult to elicit from anyone opposed to communism..
Also, the $4 billion average claimed did not take into consideration
the fact that in the last two appropriations the sum had been under
$3 billion.
The underlying reason for majority approval for the $4 billion
figure in the Gallup poll was Miso reflected in two NORC polls taken
in the same period. The first of the NORC polls revealed that eight
out of ten Americans felt that Soviet efforts "to win the friendship
- of countries like India, Egypt, and Burma by offering them economic
aid and other help" were "a serious problem for our government."
Forty-nine per cent thought that the problem was very serious,
33 per cent somewhat serious. A small fraction, 12 per cent, felt
that it should't "concern us very much at all." 2 7 2 The second question
disclosed that 40 per cent thought that the United States "should
try harder to win the friendship of such countries. . . most recom-
mending more economic and technical assistance. . . while 52 per
n273
cent were satisfied with the present effort of the government."
271. AIPO, February 23, 1956.
272. NORC, February 1956.
273. NORC, February 1956.
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Although there seemed to be a new regard for the dangers of
Soviet penetration into Asia and the Middle East, the responses
to queries about where economic aid should be sent showed only slight
changes since 1955. In February of 1956 80 per cent now approved
economic aid to "countries that have agieod to stand with us against
,,2174
Communist aggression. This was 2 per cent more than in the previous
275
year. In the 1956 pcil 89 per cent of the college-educated group
favorod aid to our fricnds, and a sizable majority (72 per cent)
of the grammar school group also approved. In the case of aid to
neutrals, approval went up from 47 per cent to 53 per cent for
continuing aid to "countries like India, which have not joined us
,,276
as allies against the Comunists.
But when it was asi ed whether long-term authority should be
granted by Congress to 3nablo the Administration to help nations on
projects that required more than a year ot two to complete, the only
national poll, taken cafrly in February of 1956, found very sizable
opposition to the unust il request. The question used by the pollsters
remained the respondent that "some projects, such as large dams, take
274. NORC, February 1156.
275. NORC, January 194F5.
276. NORC, January 1955, -February 1956.
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five or ten years to complete; bx , nevertheless, 65 per cent answered
the "we should refuse to commit 6urselves beyond a year at a time.,)
Only 25 per cent woild agree that we should contribute for "a period
of years in some cases." Even the college-educated group, which
had always stood in favor of aid, refused to agree to such a
277
commitment, althopgh the margin in this case was a close one.
The appropriation bill bfor 1957' finally agreed upon by both
Houses of Congress fell considerably short of what the Administration
had requested. That fact was due to .more than the political and
international situation. The President and Secretary of State
made evLsdent a concern which was amply shared by both Congress and
)
the public. But it was not enough simply to transmit an awareness
of the serious nature of Soviet economic penetration; there should
also have been a comprehensive plan to deal with it adequately.
This was never proposed. There was only the established plan, weighted
towards the military and larger than ever, which left both intero
nationalists and isolationists dissatisfied. Moreover, at a time
when an extensive foreign aid program was needed more than ever,
the President found himself hampered by his party's past as well
277. NORC, February 1956.
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as by indecision among his adivaors on-- iffective plan. The in-
- adequacy of Administration leadership was reflected in the state of
American public opinion. A large percentage felt.that the problem
of foreign aid was a serious one, but polls on sending aid to neutrals
shifted only a few points, and there was only a 57 -per cent majority
in favor of a $4 billion program in response to a favorably worded
question. Although a majority expressed satisfaction with present
aid efforts, a very sizable 40 per cent did not. And, when a long-
term commitment was proposed, the public would have none of it.
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